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 When diplomatic relations were publicly established between Israel, Bahrain, and the 
United Arab Emirates in September 2020, the set of agreements brokered by the Trump 
administration was given the moniker “the Abraham Accords,” after the biblical patriarch shared 
by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In the document signed between Israel and the UAE, one 
introductory point explicitly cited this heritage as the basis for normalized relations: “[The 
Parties recognize] that the Arab and Jewish peoples are descendants of a common ancestor, 
Abraham, and inspired, in that spirit, to foster in the Middle East a reality in which Muslims, 
Jews, Christians and peoples of all faiths, denominations, beliefs and nationalities live in, and are 
committed to, a spirit of coexistence, mutual understanding and mutual respect.”1 
 The legacy of this idea, that a common biblical ancestry between Jews and Arabs could 
play an essential role in determining political relations between contemporary national groups, is 
the focus of this thesis. In the early years of Zionist Jewish settlement in Palestine, the first 
formal group of which arrived in 1882, the question of relations with the pre-existing Arab 
Palestinian population presented itself. Though many Zionists were able to brush off or 
otherwise ignore the question, Jewish Odessan journalist Asher Ginzburg, writing under the pen-
name Ahad Ha’Am, wrote a prescient warning about this ignorance as early as 1891 in a series 
of articles he titled “The Truth from Eretz Israel.” The series was published in a Hebrew daily 
newspaper in St. Petersburg. “From abroad we are accustomed to believe that Eretz Yisrael 
[Palestine] is presently almost totally desolate, an uncultivated desert, and that anyone wishing to 
 
1 U.S. Department of State, Abraham Accords Peace Agreement,  Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations 
and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel, (Washington, D.C., 
September 15, 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/UAE_Israel-treaty-signed-
FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf. 
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buy land there can come and buy all he wants. But in truth it is not so,” he wrote. “From abroad 
we are accustomed to believing that the Arabs are all desert savages,…This is a big mistake. The 
Arab, like all sons of Shem [Semites], has a sharp intellect and is very cunning.” Ahad Ha’Am 
warned additionally that if the time came “when the life of our people in Eretz Yisrael develops 
to the point of encroaching upon the native population, they will not easily yield their place.”2 
Ahad Ha’Am did not set out to focus on the Arab Palestinian population in his articles, but his 
unintentional summary effectively captured the essence of what came to be called the “Arab 
Question,” or the existence of an indigenous population in Palestine that vastly outnumbered the 
Jews, and whose national rights were at odds with growing Jewish settlement.  
 In his landmark work Zionism and the Arabs 1882-1948: A Study of Ideology, Yosef 
Gorny outlined four ideological outlooks on the “Arab Question” in the period between the 
Young Turk Revolution in 1908 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914: “altruistic 
integration,” separatism, liberalism, and the “constructive socialist” approach. The integrationist 
group described by Gorny consisted of a mix of Palestinian-born and immigrant Ashkenazi and 
Sephardi teachers, journalists, and intellectuals: Eliyahu Sapir, Yitzhak Epstein, Yehoshua 
Radler-Feldmann, Yosef Luria, and Nissim Malul.3 Though Gorny offered a brief description of 
this group, he did not delve into the details of their visions for integration nor did he explore the 
shared intellectual roots between the advocates or the influence of race theories on their thinking.  
Others after Gorny have looked at these figures as individual outliers, or examined them within 
their particular ethnic context, such as studies of Sephardi/Mizrahi Zionism and Ottomanism by 
Michelle Campos and Abigail Jacobson. Alternatively, Jonathan Gribetz has looked at the early 
 
2 Ahad Ha’Am, “Emet Me-Eretz Israel” (Truth from Eretz Yisrael) in Al parashat derakhim v.1 (Berlin, 
1930). Reprinted in Alan Dowty, “Much Ado About Little: Ahad Ha'am's ‘Truth from Eretz Yisrael," 
Zionism, and the Arabs.” Israel Studies 5, no. 2 (2000): 154–81. 
3 Yosef Gorny, Zionism and the Arabs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987): 40-77.  
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Zionist-Arab encounter and some of the ways in which early Zionists – First Aliyah Ashkenazim 
and Sephardi Ottomans – defined their non-Jewish neighbors in religious and racial terms.4 Other 
recent scholarship, like that of Hanan Harif, has examined Ashkenazi fascination with the Orient 
and Jewish-Muslim religious affinity. 
 This thesis will more comprehensively examine the members of the integrationist 
cohort first identified by Gorny – Eliyahu Sapir, Yitzhak Epstein, Yehoshua Radler-Feldmann, 
and Nissim Malul – and suggest the inclusion of two more figures: Esther and Shimon Moyal. In 
revisiting the integrationists, I will focus especially on their discourse around Semitic identity as 
a racial category and their related advocacy for Jewish-Arab cooperation based around four key 
goals: developing a set of shared Jewish-Arab institutions (such as schools, literary and cultural 
societies, and newspapers), cultivating knowledge of Arabic as a shared language, bringing 
Zionists’ attention to growing Arab Palestinian resentment, and highlighting the agricultural and 
economic developmental achievements of Zionism among Arab readers of the contemporary 
press. 
 In examining integrationist thinking, I do not contend that their platform constituted a 
“road-not-taken” during this decisive period in Zionism’s history. Integrationism as an 
“outlook,” to use Gorny’s term, was one among many at the point before Zionism had cohered 
around a specific set of values or a centralized set of activities in Palestine. That is not to say that 
each was equally likely to have succeeded. Rather, I argue that integrationist writings offer a 
window into how racial theories shaped Zionist thinking, and how they helped to cement the 
view that Jews belonged essentially – that is, fundamentally – to Palestine by virtue of their 
racial heritage as Semites. While Gribetz, Harif, and Jacobson partially touch on this idea in their 
 
4 Jonathan Marc Gribetz, Defining Neighbors: Religion, Race, and the Early Zionist-Arab Encounter. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014): 95. 
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work, what tends to take center stage are the finer religious and political distinctions used by the 
intellectuals studied here. When Gribetz looks at Nissim Malul and Shimon Moyal’s writing in 
the Hebrew press, for example, he focuses on their distinct characterizations of Muslim Arabs 
and Christian Arabs, and concludes that they focused largely on these religious categories as key 
markers of difference. This argument appears in Jacobson’s studies on Malul and Moyal as well. 
And while this is true, what is omitted is the racialized language that Malul and Moyal used to 
describe Muslim Arabs as “fellow Semites” and Christian Arabs as non-Semitic people and the 
consequences of such rhetoric. 
 What I aim to do in examining what I would call “Semitism” in the writing of Zionist 
intellectuals is to develop an understanding of it as a category that, while not entirely fixed, was 
crystallizing in the early twentieth century. Paired with the establishment of hierarchical and 
“scientific” racial classifications, the idea of Jews as Semites laid the rhetorical foundation for 
Jews’ belonging “naturally” in Palestine. Under this paradigm, Zionism could move beyond the 
fulfillment of a religious ideal based on the Jews’ longing to return to the Holy Land – which in 
fact had limited appeal in traditional Jewish circles, whose members were generally opposed to 
the idea of Jews actualizing this return themselves through Zionism – and could also fulfill a 
secular ideal of a clearly defined racial group returning to its homeland. Establishing a racial 
basis for Jewish immigration to Palestine became and remains a cornerstone of Zionist discourse. 
 In addition to drawing attention to the role of racial discourse in integrationist thinking, 
this study also argues that we should view Ashkenazi and Sephardi Zionists as living in the 
overlapping cultural and political milieus, even as they maintained some of their more insular 
affiliations and their separate intellectual influences. One such shared idea was the belief that 
Jews were a fundamentally – that is, racially – Semitic people descended from tribes in the 
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Levant, making them incompatible with the Aryan races of Europe. This early intellectual 
exchange and shared discourse between Sephardi and Ashkenazi Zionists suggests a porous 
barrier between the communities, which have previously been studied in relative isolation. By 
extension, what is at stake in this argument is the prevailing consensus that Sephardim were 
predominantly integrationists and therefore generally opposed or indifferent to Zionism, while 
Ashkenazim came to Palestine primarily as separatists as early as the Second Aliyah. While 
certainly there were ardent separatist Zionists, I argue it is nevertheless significant that in the 
period before World War I, Zionists coming from Lithuanian, Galician, Tunisian, and Maghrebi 
descent were able to arrive at similar conclusions about Jewish-Arab cooperation, constituting a 
cohort of fierce internal critics of the Zionist movement, and of political Zionism in particular.  
 Another issue at stake is the fundamental understanding of the nature of Zionist activity 
in its earlier stages. The Zionist movement was not yet truly headquartered in Palestine before 
World War I, even as the Palestine Office opened in 1908 in a two-room apartment in Jaffa under 
the leadership of Arthur Ruppin. While much of the political work of the Zionist Organization 
was still centered in Europe between 1908 and 1914, this period marked the initial turn from 
“diplomatic Zionism” to “practical Zionism.” This entailed undertaking cultural planning and 
development in Palestine -- out of the Jaffa Office in particular -- that laid the foundation for 
future developments including the revival of the Hebrew language and the establishment of 
“modern” settlements.5 Therefore, what I focus on here is the developing sentiment in Palestine 
as a satellite of the larger Zionist Organization. The figures under discussion here worked with 
and for the Zionist Organization in different capacities, even as they held views about Jewish-
 
5 Etan Bloom, Arthur Ruppin and the Production of Pre-Israeli Culture. (Leiden: Brill, 2011): 73-74. See 
also Arieh Bruce Saposnik, Becoming Hebrew: The Creation of a Jewish National Culture in Ottoman 
Palestine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) on the cultural groundwork established by Second 
Aliyah Zionists in Palestine. 
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Arab relations and the path of settlement that were, at times, entirely at odds with the views of 
organizational leadership. By viewing Malul, the Moyals, and their Ashkenazi counterparts as 
internal critics, one might also understand Zionism as a more pluralistic, negotiated movement in 
this period. In this I build on Jacobson, who used her study of Sephardi Zionism to argue for the 
“complex and heterogeneous nature of Zionism” in the period before World War I, defining it as 
a diversified ideology rather than a monolithic movement.6  
 Despite the fact that the Labor faction would come to dominate the Zionist movement 
during the British Mandate period following World War I, this was not necessarily the case, nor 
was it apparent, before the war. Given the particular constraints of Zionist activity under 
Ottoman rule, the movement was less defined from the top. At the 1909 Zionist Congress, the 
president of the Zionist Organization David Wolffsohn spelled out the organization’s platform: 
“We aspire to build within the framework of the Ottoman Empire a nationality like other 
nationalities in the Ottoman realm. Our ambition is to earn the reputation of being the most loyal, 
trustworthy, and useful nation among the national groups, but a Jewish nation.”7 This left room 
for wide interpretation of what “Jewish nation” would mean and what the precise relationship 
between Jews and Ottomans, and Jews and Arab Muslims and Christians, would be in practice. 
Indeed, Dmitry Shumsky has argued that the idea of a sovereign, separate Jewish nation-state 
was not the “normative paradigm” of Zionism from the beginning, nor in this period.8  
Finally, in this thesis I aim both to shed light on the integrationist cohort as well as 
suggest their inclusion in the intellectual and social structure defined by Ussama Makdisi as the 
“ecumenical frame.” As Makdisi argues in Age of Coexistence: The Ecumenical Frame and the 
 
6 Abigail Jacobson, From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem between Ottoman and British Rule. (Syracuse, 
N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2011): 116. 
7 Isaiah Freidman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism 1897-1918. (Oxford University Press 1977): 147. 
8 Dmitry Shumsky, Beyond the Nation-State (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2018): 1-23.  
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Making of the Modern Arab World, religious communities in the late Ottoman empire were 
developing modern norms of coexistence in civic life rooted in the history of Ottoman religious 
tolerance.9 One oversight in Makdisi’s monograph is the place of Jewish intellectuals in 
developing or participating in this frame. He writes predominantly about growing Muslim-
Christian cooperation in this period to the exclusion of well-known Jewish participants in the 
Nahda such as Esther Moyal, who is described only by two sentences in the book. Makdisi 
argues that the arrival of Zionism in Palestine and European colonialism after the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire trampled upon the burgeoning ecumenical frame. What I suggest here is that 
this frame of mind was -- at least in the period before World War I -- not incompatible with some 
versions of Zionist thinking. Figures like Malul and Moyal, especially, insisted on the “absolute 
compatibility of their Ottomanism and Zionism,” to borrow a phrase from Campos.10 This 
suggests a more complicated picture for early Zionism, which, for many adherents was not yet a 
separatist movement and, in fact, was consistently justified by them as a movement to benefit the 
Ottoman body politic more broadly. 
 Chapter 1 of this thesis will present the intellectual and cultural backdrop for 
integrationism during the Second Aliyah period, particularly the discourses around Hebrew 
revival and the early “Arabization” of Jewish immigrants and Ashkenazi members of the Old 
Yishuv. Chapter 2 will revisit the writing and thinking of Sephardi Zionists Shimon Moyal, 
Esther Azhari Moyal, and Nissim Malul. I will draw particular attention to the ways in which 
race and language influenced their visions for Jewish-Arab cooperation. Chapter 3 will then 
 
9 Ussama Makdisi, Age of Coexistence: The Ecumenical Frame and the Making of the Modern Arab 
World. (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019): 1-27. 
10 Michelle U. Campos, “Between ‘Beloved Ottomania’ and ‘the Land of Israel’: The Struggle Over 
Ottomanism and Zionism among Palestine's Sephardi Jews, 1908-13.” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 37, no. 4 (2005): 461–83. 
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explore similar goals and influences in the writing of three Ashkenazi Zionist integrationists of 
the same period: Yehoshua Radler-Feldmann, Eliyahu Sapir, and Yitzhak Epstein. This section 






Chapter 1: “Arabizing” and “Hebraizing” in Ottoman Palestine 
 This section discusses the backdrop upon which integrationist projections and 
speculations played out during the Second Aliyah period, roughly 1904-1914. One key 
development was the labor struggle in Palestine, which laid the foundation for discussions 
around the cultural and political identity of the Jewish settlement in Palestine, or the Yishuv. The 
Second Aliyah, or the second wave of European Jewish immigrants to Palestine, changed and 
augmented the Yishuv demographically. A number of socialist and revolutionary Eastern 
European Jews came to agricultural settlements and cities in Palestine, bringing with them 
utopian visions of a renewed Jewish life. They founded two major political parties and formed 
the first Jewish agricultural collective settlements. Many members of the Second Aliyah were 
influenced by socialist ideology, viewing peasantry and physical labor as the bedrock of society. 
Others were motivated by the Jewish enlightenment, or Haskalah, idea of “productivizing” the 
Jewish population through direct labor and a transition away from their historically intermediary 
economic roles as merchants and estate managers. The experience of these immigrants with 
Russian pogroms also made them particularly focused on self-defense and security when they 
arrived in Palestine.  
 The majority of Second Aliyah immigrants settled in towns and cities, but those who 
were ideologically motivated sought to live out their ideals by working on agricultural 
settlements. Despite the Ottoman government’s attempt to slow and prevent land sales to non-
Ottoman Jews, in 1901 the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) was able to purchase large 
territories in the Tiberias district and expanded its efforts to remove peasants from them. These 
removal efforts, paired with rumors about new regulations that would enable Jews to enter 
Palestine freely, triggered greater resistance from Arab peasants and tenants. Villagers 
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dispossessed by the purchase of land made their displeasure known to the JCA official who came 
to measure the area for sale, and troops were brought in to remove those who refused to be 
evicted. Further expansion of Jewish settlements in 1903 were temporarily leased to Arab 
villagers but led to further clashes and the death of a Jewish settler in 1904.11 
 In addition to localized clashes in Palestine, structural changes meant that the practical 
situation of Jewish agricultural settlements was at a low point in 1903: the patronage of Baron 
Rothschild, who had materially supported the first settlements, had been withdrawn in 1900 and 
the World Zionist Organization had turned its focus from practical settlement to gaining the 
sponsorship of a Great Power. These, along with a renewed effort by the successive Ottoman 
Mutasarrifs (district officers) of the Jerusalem district to enforce restrictions on land sales to non-
Ottomans, made it increasingly difficult for new immigrants of the Second Aliyah to actually 
work the land and become small farmers.12  
 As many of half of the immigrants in this wave left due to difficult conditions. But 
those who remained continued to build the presence of the New Yishuv, coming into clashes 
with both the Arab majority in Palestine as well as members of the older Jewish community, or 
the Old Yishuv. In 1905, the more recent arrivals formed the Po’alei Tsiyon party. Building on 
the ideas of Ukrainian-born Labor Zionist Ber Borochov, the members of Po’alei Tsiyon hoped 
to create a Jewish proletariat in Palestine that could then take part in a larger class struggle. The 
second major leftist party of the Second Aliyah, Hapo’el Hatza’ir, rejected Marxist-socialism 
and class struggle, instead supporting transformation by physical labor and settlement on the 
 
11 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010): 102-103 and Neville J. Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism Before World 
War I. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976): 22-23. 
12 Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996): 46 and Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism, 24-25.  
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land. Despite their differences, the parties shared in the belief that a large and firmly-rooted 
Jewish agricultural and industrial class in Palestine would fulfill the aims of the Zionist project 
and would remedy the dysfunctions and “abnormalities” of Diaspora Jewry.13 Upon arriving in 
Palestine, Jews of the Second Aliyah were repelled by the colonial model set up by the First 
Aliyah – the Baron Rothschild colonies relied on Arab laborers while Jews remained in positions 
of supervision. 
 The labor Zionists in Palestine emphasized kibbush ha-avodah (the conquest of labor) 
both as a personal process for one to overcome a bourgeois class background by physical labor 
as well as in the collective sense of mastering the types of work, like difficult agricultural labor, 
that few Jews held in the Diaspora. And yet the reality in Palestine was quite different: the 
agricultural jobs to which these Jewish arrivals aspired were dominated by Arab wage laborers. 
The abundant supply of cheaper and experienced Arab labor made competition virtually 
impossible for newer Jewish immigrants. It was in this context that the “conquest of labor” 
gained a third meaning as a struggle to replace Arab workers with Jewish ones in virtually every 
sector of the Jewish economy developing in Palestine. According to their platform, “a necessary 
condition for the realization of Zionism is the conquest of all occupations in Palestine by 
Jews.”14 As Zachary Lockman has shown, it was this inability to compete effectively for 
relatively scarce jobs in the Palestinian labor market that fueled the “Hebrew Labor” campaign 
which gained a central place in labor Zionist discourse and practice.15  
 
13 Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies : Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948. 
(University of California Press: 1996): 21-53. 
14 Gershon Shafir, “The Meeting of Eastern Europe and Yemen: ‘Idealistic Workers’ and ‘Natural 
Workers’ in Early Zionist Settlement in Palestine.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 13, no. 2 (1990): 172–97. 
15 Lockman, Comrades and Enemies, 21-53. 
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 However, this movement was not only too weak to enforce its demands on private 
employers, but it also did not address the Yishuv’s larger economic problems: low investment in 
Palestine by private capital and the insufficient number of jobs for Jewish immigrants on a 
broader scale. Unable to compete for agricultural jobs, Jewish workers remained a minority and 
Arab workers continued on in Jewish-owned fields, with Jews gaining control of some skilled 
jobs like pruning, grafting, and operating irrigation pumps.16 In response, labor Zionists changed 
their focus to efforts that would create a greater number of jobs – particularly through the 
development of a higher wage Jewish economy with its own industrial, financial, transport, and 
service industries.17 These labor market challenges also prompted the adoption of the kibbutz 
model of collective agricultural settlement, which would better secure employment for Jewish 
immigrants and advance settlement by excluding Arab laborers entirely.18  
 After 1908, an uncensored press in the Ottoman Empire enabled more pronounced 
protest against Jewish immigration and land purchases by the Jewish Colonization Association 
and the Jewish National Fund, which drew broader attention to the question of relations with 
Arabs of Palestine and their place in the economy. On top of the political and ideological conflict 
between the labor Zionists, there emerged a cultural struggle between Yiddishist and Hebraist 
factions, as well as an ongoing discussion in the Hebrew press that attempted to make sense of 
how and where the Hebrew cultural initiatives that were nestled within settlement-driven and 
labor Zionism would fit into the demographic and political reality of Ottoman Palestine – that is, 
the Palestinian Arab majority. Using the language of racial brotherhood and shared linguistic and 
cultural history, some Zionists argued that successful settlement of the land depended upon 
 
16 Shapira, Anita. Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948. (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1992): 63-66 and Shafir, “The Meeting of Eastern Europe and Yemen,” 175. 
17 Lockman, Comrades and Enemies, 21-53. 
18 Shafir, Land, Labor, 113-114. 
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integration and cooperation, and they made appeals to the broader Hebrew revival movement – 
arguing that knowledge of Arabic would bring Jews closer to their “Semitic roots” as people 
originating in Palestine. 
 The idea that Jews were pariahs in Europe because of their Semitic descent gained 
currency in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, including in Jewish circles.19 As the Jewish 
writer, scholar, and founder of the Hibbat Tsion organization Moshe Leib Lilienblum wrote after 
the 1881 pogroms in southwestern Russia, “We are aliens, not only here, but in all of Europe, for 
it is not our fatherland…We are Semites among Aryans, the sons of Shem among the sons of 
Japheth, a Palestinian tribe from Asia in the European lands…We will still remain aliens when 
we will be stuffed with education as a pomegranate is with seeds.”20 Lilienblum rejected prior 
attempts at acculturation and Haskalah, or enlightenment, arguing instead that there existed a 
fundamental racial distinction between Jews and Europeans that could not be bridged. How 
Lilienblum arrived at the idea of “Semitism” – that is, the idea that Jews and Arabs were both 
descendants of Shem, son of the biblical Noah, and therefore were of the same racial lineage as 
Middle Eastern peoples – as the explanation for Jews’ troubles in Europe was a longer process at 
least one hundred years in the making.  
 The term “Semitic” began as a linguistic category first used by German Orientalist 
August Ludwig von Schlözer as early as 1771, citing the Genesis chapter describing the 
descendants of Shem and their distinct language and peoplehood.21 However it was the French 
 
19 James Renton “The End of the Semites,” in Ben Gidley and James Renton, eds. Antisemitism and 
Islamophobia in Europe a Shared Story? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 99-127. 
20 Zvi Y. Gitelman, A Century of Ambivalence: The Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the 
Present. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001): 18, and Hanan Harif “Judaism and Islam in Pre-
State Zionist Thought: Moshe Ayzman, Yehoshua Radler-Feldmann and Alexander Ziskind Rabinowitz” 
in Making History Jewish: The Dialectics of Jewish History in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, eds. 
Scott Ury and Pawel Maciejko (Brill 2020): 210-226. 
21 Renton, “The End of the Semites,” 102-104. 
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Orientalist Ernest Renan who developed and popularized the understanding of “Semite” as a 
modern racial category as distinct from “Aryan” in his Histoire générale et système comparé des 
langues sémitiques (1855). In presenting his theory of Semitic linguistic distinctiveness and the 
existence of a unique “Semitic spirit,” Renan introduced essential categories into theological 
discussions. This also had strong political implications about peoplehood and nationalism, as 
Renan considered Hebrews, Jews, Arabs and other Semites to be a race excluded from any forms 
of political organization.22 According to Gil Anidjar, this equivalence formed the basis of the 
“Semitic hypothesis,” the European logic by which “whatever was said about Jews could equally 
be said about Arabs, and vice versa.”23  
 These views hinged on and were influenced by the development of European 
Orientalism, the term first defined by Edward Said as the primarily British and French 
essentialist view of the East as a place of mystery, exoticism, and permanent difference. The 
image of the Orient developed by European linguists, artists, and authors helped to define Europe 
in relation to a permanent “other.”24 Simultaneously, Orientalism coincided with the 
development of modern race theory and social Darwinism. Racial classifications developed and 
published over the course of the nineteenth century added a sense of scientific validity to the 
division of “advanced” European races and “backward” Oriental and African ones.25 The study 
and classification of various language families, including Indo-European and Semitic, led to the 
subsequent assumption that the users of different languages would be correspondingly distinct in 
culture, body, and mind.26 Thus, race and religion as categories of study and of human 
 
22 Gil Anidjar,  Semites: Race, Religion, Literature. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008): 
30-32. 
23 Anidjar, Semites, 18 
24 Edward W. Said, Orientalism. (New York: Vintage Books, 1994): 1-3. 
25 Ibid. 206 
26 Ibid. 233 
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classification came into existence contemporaneously in the early modern period alongside the 
rise of popular and scholarly interest in “the Orient.”27  
 Marwa Elshakry’s work has established the spread of Darwin’s writing in Arabic 
circles, as well as the birth of a globalized discourse on race sparked by his original publication. 
The fact that both European Orientalists and intellectuals based in the Arab Middle East were 
reading and consuming a shared body of popular scientific works helps place the discourse 
around “the Semitic race” and Palestine in broader context.28 The circulation of Darwin’s ideas 
and the production of related commentary on social reform and eugenics in Arabic newspapers 
like al-Muqtataf, and commentaries by the Islamic reformers Jamal al-din al-Afghani and 
Muhammad ‘Abduh, provide critical context for the thinking and writing of the Sephardi Jews I 
discuss here. Members of the Arabic Jewish intelligentsia like Esther and Shimon Moyal and 
Nissim Malul were not only consuming material on popular science and social reform from 
European presses, but they also would have been reading related commentaries in Arabic 
publications by ‘Abduh and al-Afghani that informed their discussions of economic 
modernization and progress.  
 Today the term “Semite/Semitism” is almost entirely out of use except in the case of 
the term “anti-Semitism” – this ephemerality, Anidjar argues, was due to the fact that Semites 
only existed in the European consciousness “for precisely as long as Europe thought of itself as 
resolutely secular, as having achieved secularization.” When Jews and Arabs were “equally 
Semites, [they] were both race and religion in a secular political world.” However, by contrast, in 
the post-World War II period, and particularly after Nazism, “one can divide them again, divide 
 
27 Anidjar, Semites, 27. 
28 Marwa Elshakry, Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2013): 1-24, 246-247. 
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the world between political entities, religious ones, and racial (or cultural) ones.”29 This period 
during which the “Semitic hypothesis” first brought together Jews and Arabs under the same 
umbrella of peoplehood is the chief interest of this thesis, as it informed the writing and thinking 
of Zionists and was accepted by many – within Zionism and outside of it – as plain fact. 
 Other studies have examined how European Orientalism influenced “the Hebrew 
imagination” and Zionist thinking. Yaron Peleg has argued that despite their embeddedness in 
the West, European Jews had a different relationship with Orientalism, viewing themselves – as 
Lilienblum expressed – as a foreign element in Europe and maintaining a sense of connection to 
their Eastern origins. Peleg and Yael Zerubavel have explored the multilayered anxieties of 
Zionists encountering the East, both imagined and real: “Zionists looked to the East for a cultural 
alternative. But like European colonists, they felt the need to distance themselves from the Arabs 
in order to maintain the integrity of their emerging national culture. The Arab way of life and the 
actual Palestinian landscapes were new, different, and mysterious to Zionists… but the biblical 
associations of these landscapes made them part of traditional Jewish culture as well.” Jews who 
came to Palestine were wary of “going native,” particularly those who wanted to guard their 
culture-in-the-making from outside influence. But matters were made more complicated by the 
sense of affinity many early Zionist pioneers felt toward local Arabs, for ethnic and historical 
reasons. “Rather than fantasize a nonexistent East, many Zionist pioneers looked up to the local 
Palestinian Arabs and mimicked the Arab way of life in the hope of reinventing themselves and 
creating a new Jewish culture inspired by their image,” Peleg argues.30  
 
29 Anidjar, Semites, 20. 
30 Yaron Peleg, Orientalism and the Hebrew Imagination (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005): 9. 
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 As was the case for other Western observers, Ottoman Palestine was simultaneously a 
“fetid Oriental wasteland and [a] resplendent biblical garden.”31 This duality within Orientalism 
shaped the lens through which European Jews viewed Palestine and its inhabitants, providing a 
language – often patronizing and essentializing – to describe it as well as a means to co-opt 
portions of it. Lilienblum’s use of the term “Semites” remains a strong example of the two 
modes of Jewish Orientalism that positioned Jews’ heritage as a source of permanent and actual 
difference, but not exclusively as a source of supposed degeneracy. Moreover, Lilienblum, like 
the authors I will discuss below, used the term “Semites” not as a rhetorical symbol or allusion 
but rather as a statement of fact.  
 In his article, “Europe and Its Orients in Zionist Culture Before the First World War,” 
Arieh Saposnik detailed how this idea influenced Zionist visions of racial fusion, the potential 
for spiritual and physical rejuvenation of the Jews by their returning East, and the need to 
cultivate a Palestine-based Hebrew cultural revival.32 Saposnik focuses mostly on Zionist 
discourse in Ashkenazi circles, finding several examples of this Eastward-facing attitude in the 
Zionist paper ha-Poel ha-Tsair. In 1908, for example, one editorial published in the paper argued 
that, in response to the Young Turk Revolution, it was time “to openly declare to all that we are a 
branch of the Semitic peoples who must all unite and carry out a defensive struggle against all 
those who would seek to sow among us the seeds of European virtue.”33 Here the idea of an 
 
31 Lester Vogel, To See a Promised Land: Americans and the Holy Land in the Nineteenth Century 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993): 216. See also Yehoshua Ben-Arieh The 
Rediscovery of the Holy Land In the Nineteenth Century (Jerusalem, Magnes Press 1979) and Burke O. 
Long, Imagining the Holy Land: Maps, Models, and Fantasy Travels (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2003). 
32 Arieh Bruce Saposnik,  “Europe and Its Orients in Zionist Culture Before the First World War.” The 
Historical Journal 49, no. 4 (2006): 1105–23. 
33 Ibid. 1109 
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alliance with a reinvigorated post-revolution Ottoman East intersected with an understanding of 
Semiticness as a core quality shared by recently arrived Jews and Ottomans. 
 Social Darwinism, and the related idea of pan-Semitism, posited that Jews and Arabs 
were not strangers but something like long-lost brothers or cousins. Given this, Gribetz argues, it 
is important to keep in mind that these two groups were not “engaging with each other for the 
first time in a modern nationalist struggle over a contested piece of land, but rather as peoples 
encountering deeply familiar, if at times mythologized or distorted, others.” The backdrop of 
early twentieth-century race theories informed such interactions. That race theorists would have 
considered the two groups to be members of  “a single ancient race or, at any rate, close racial 
(Semitic) relatives was not inconsequential to either Jews’ or Arabs’ experience of this encounter 
but rather, for many, central to it,” Gribetz writes.34 The engagement of new arrivals to Palestine 
with Arab inhabitants, therefore, can be seen as a logical Zionist conclusion: if Jews were to 
return to the land of Palestine and the land, culture, and inhabitants were Arab, then the Jews 
would necessarily need to become or reconcile with their Semitic-ness. 
 The language used to discuss the relationship between Jews and Arabs in this period 
was influenced by the sights and sounds of daily life in Ottoman Palestine as well as by loftier 
ideas about Zionism and Hebrew revival in Palestine. The evident integration in Palestine 
between older Jewish and Muslim communities not only purportedly offered some evidence for 
the Semitic thesis, but it also prompted discussions in Zionist circles about the mixing of Hebrew 
and Arabic and the types of relations that should be promoted as greater numbers of Jews arrived 
in Palestine. 
 
34 Gribetz, Defining Neighbors, 16-17. 
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  Even before the first Zionist settlements in Palestine, the Jewish population was of 
mixed origin: Jewish pilgrimage in previous decades brought Ashkenazi Jews from Eastern 
Europe as well as Sephardi communities from North Africa, Anatolia, and Bulgaria. There were 
also Jews of Sephardi and Ashkenazi descent who had historically settled in the four “holy 
cities” of Palestine: Safed, Tiberias, Hebron, and Jerusalem. These groups included Yiddish-
speaking communities, some of whom also used Ladino, Arabic, or Hebrew in contact with their 
neighbors.35 Recent studies of Ottoman Jerusalem and other urban centers have also suggested 
that these were places of deeper integration than previously thought. Menachem Klein’s work on 
Arab Jewish identity before the rise of nationalist movements argues that it was through 
Palestine’s modernizing efforts, and in its shared coffeeshops, festivals, neighborhoods, and 
schools that a unique “horizontal Arab Jewish identity” formed, and that it included both Jews of 
Ashkenazi and Sephardi descent. Salim Tamari’s work on Wasif Jawhariyyeh’s memoirs has 
also shown an ingrained cultural hybridity in the city forged through shared festivals, business 
partnerships, and social venues.36  
 Jews living in Jerusalem often had Muslim landlords, and ties between neighbors, 
tenants, and merchants led to language exchange. But according to the memoirs of Ya’acov 
Yehoshua, Hebrew author A.B. Yehoshua’s father, “the Arabic spoken by Ashkenazim was 
incorrect and a subject of jest” by Sephardim.37 This also led to the creation of Palestinian 
Yiddish – Yiddish inflected with Arabic words and expressions. As Klein argues, the Arabic 
 
35 Bernard Spolsky and Robert Cooper, The Languages of Jerusalem, (Oxford University: 1991) 49-56;  
Salim Tamari, “Ishaq al-Shami and the Predicament of the Arab Jew in Palestine,” Jerusalem Quarterly 
21 (2004): 10-26. 
36 Salim Tamari, Mountain against the Sea: Essays on Palestinian Society and Culture. (Los Angeles, 
Calif.: University of California Press, 2009): 71-86. 
37 Ya’akov Yehoshua Childhood in Old Jerusalem v. 2 (Jerusalem, R. Mas: 1979): 240, quoted in 
Menachem Klein, Lives in Common: Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Hebron, trans. Haim 
Watzman. ( York: Oxford University Press, 2014): 40. 
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words that entered local Yiddish suggest “extensive, ongoing ties” beyond simple commerce. 
This included the exchange of words to describe conversation, mutual respect, and language to 
depict moods, dishes, administrative institutions, types of buildings, and dress.38 Moreover, the 
“flexibility” of Yiddish allowed it to absorb forms and influences from Arabic that led to a 
distinctive language used both between Jewish communities and between Jewish and non-Jewish 
communities.39 
 An additional marker of deep integration can be found in the festivals and public 
celebrations in Jerusalem that drew in diverse celebrants. The Nabi Musa celebration – the 
flashpoint of the riots that later broke out in 1920 – was remembered by memoirists including 
Ya’akov Yehoshua, Ezra Menachem, and Wasif Jawyariyyeh as a time of joy and fanfare. Jews 
from Hebron would accompany Muslim pilgrims to the Nabi Musa site in Jericho and other 
families would welcome pilgrims upon their return. In addition, despite separate educational 
systems, it was not rare for Jewish students to study in Arab schools and vice versa.40 Yair 
Wallach’s work on Jerusalem also demonstrates how movements of daily life would take a 
resident of Jerusalem through various quarters. Far from a static map of ethno-religious enclaves, 
prewar Jerusalem was more fluid and cosmopolitan precisely because subsistence required travel 
and encounter with members of other communities and classes.41  
 However, the Ashkenazi Jews described by Klein and Wallach were descendants of 
immigrants who came to Palestine from Eastern Europe in the early-to-mid-19th century, referred 
 
38 Menachem Klein, “Arab Jew in Palestine.” Israel Studies 19, no. 3 (2014): 134–53.  
39 Yonatan Mandel, “Palestinian Yiddish and Its Meanings” Jama’a 25 (2011) 173-192 [Hebrew]. See 
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40 Salim Tamari, Mountain Against the Sea, 84-86 and Klein, “Arab Jew,” 140-146. 
41 Yair Wallach, “Jerusalem between Segregation and Integration: Reading Urban Space through the Eyes 
of Justice Gad Frumkin” in Modernity, Minority, and the Public Sphere : Jews and Christians in the 
Middle East, Goldstein-Sabbah, S. R, and H. L Murre-van den Berg, eds. (Leiden: Brill: 2016): 205-233. 
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to as members of the “Old Yishuv,” not necessarily members of the First or Second Aliyah, or 
what was called the “New Yishuv.” The newer arrivals to Palestine, Zionist immigrants who 
were sometimes called “Moskūbī” [Moscow people] to distinguish them from older Arabized 
Jews, did not merge seamlessly into the preexisting structures of mixed neighborhoods, schools, 
and languages.42  
 However, new arrivals to Palestine had to contend with these surroundings. Particularly 
for Hebrew revivalists, the question of whether and how Arabic culture would influence the 
Yishuv was a pressing one in this period. A closer examination of Jewish commentators, who 
expressed both cautious and proud attitudes around the “Arabization” of Jews settling in 
Palestine in the First and Second Aliyot validates Peleg’s assertion that European Jews had a 
complex relationship to Orientalism colored by their own sense of being Semitic. For First 
Aliyah settlers, the regional lingua franca was unavoidable — contact with Arab laborers, 
Bedouin and Circassian guards, and Arab women employed in house work or in markets created 
conditions for Jews to pick up Arabic words that they often mixed with Yiddish. 
 The Second Aliyah, despite the attempted Hebrew Labor movement and the shift 
toward Hebrew exclusivism, still inherited many of these structures such that immigrants were 
inevitably exposed to and took hold of ambient Arabic influence in Palestine. Large lexical gaps 
and the absence of colloquialisms meant that often speakers turned to Arabic to fill in where 
Hebrew had yet to expand. Even intentional lexical planners such as Ben-Yehuda borrowed 
Arabic words and Ben-Yehuda himself attempted, to no avail, to annex the entirety of native 
Arab roots into Hebrew. Many of his proposed Arabic-based neologisms were rejected, but many 
 
42 Klein, “Arab Jew,” 136. 
 22 
were also adopted.43 Culturally, organizations like ha-Shomer, which will be described in more 
detail in Chapter 3, took pride in embracing performative displays of “Arab-ness” in this period 
— riding their horses in a similar style, donning headdresses, learning Arabic, and hosting Arab 
guests.44 Writers in Hebrew newspapers like Ha-Tsvi and Havatselet called for learning Arabic,45 
indicating that the idea of Arabic as an important component of inter-Ottoman Zionism was well 
within the popular discourse. Language teachers, too, discussed the importance and relevance of 
Arabic to the Yishuv’s burgeoning educational system. In the Protocols of the First Conference 
of the Association of Hebrew Teachers of Palestine, Arabic was discussed as the language of 
government officials, and it was noted that “natives of the land respect no one who does not 
speak Arabic.”46 In other words, knowledge of Arabic would be required to undertake any 
Zionist work in the land. As I will demonstrate in greater detail in Chapter 3, this suggests that 
the idea of adopting Arabic as a core component of Zionism was not restricted to Sephardi or 
Mizrahi Jewish circles. 
 Hebrew authors, a major contingent of the movement for Hebrew revival, who wrote 
about life in the Yishuv also tended to insert “Arabisms” into their stories to lend an air of 
“Oriental authenticity” to the world and daily life they described.47 Indeed, it is clear that 
individuals like Moshe Smilansky, who arrived in Palestine in 1890 from Ukraine and settled in 
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Rehovot, saw and depicted Palestinian Arabs in his early stories as “primitive natives” who were 
paternalistically described as uniquely passionate, proud, and courageous.48 But even Smilansky 
transitioned in his writing from “ambivalent separation” between Jews and Arabs to “enthusiastic 
integration.”49 
 These displays of appreciation and appropriation of Arabic culture were not without 
their detractors. Editor and literary critic Yosef Klausner was particularly vocal about the 
influence of Arabic in his column in ha-Shiloah. He, along with Ahad Ha’am and other purists, 
expressed concern at the neologisms and adopted Arabisms cropping up in the literature and 
spoken language of Jews settling in Palestine. “In every account I get a stronger and stronger 
sense of the Arabs' powerful and direct influence on the new Jews,” Klausner wrote in 1908, 
noting “the profusion of Arabic words that the writers of Eretz Israel use when they wish to 
describe the lives of the people in the farming communities….And what strange pleasure they 
get from describing every Eretz Israel Jew as speaking Arabic and resembling an Arab!”50 
Klausner and other critics responded to what they saw as a culturally existential threat posed by 
the profusion of Arab influence on popular culture and daily life in the Yishuv. The pitch of their 
concern suggests that Arabic-Hebrew fusion was plainly obvious given the structure and social 
context of the Yishuv, and the resistance to this cultural phenomenon illuminates some of its 
power, its spread, and its urgency for Hebrew revivalists. 
 In a similar vein, Arthur Ruppin’s vision as head of the Palestine Office of the Zionist 
Organization was to culturally isolate the Yishuv to keep it distinct from its Arab surroundings. 
Influenced by eugenics discourse, Ruppin sought cultural and economic partitions in this period 
 
48 Peleg, Orientalism and the Hebrew Imagination, 75-77 
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that would allow a siloed Jewish body to “recover from exile” and return to “vitality.”51 Ruppin 
was also involved in Ahuzat Bayit, the society formed in 1906 to purchase and develop land near 
Jaffa that would become the city of Tel Aviv. The society’s founders were explicit in their 
intention to create the first “all-Jewish” city, in contrast with the mixed city of Jaffa.52 The sixty 
members of Ahuzat Bayit included established Sephardi and recently arrived Ashkenazi Jews. 
The society set about establishing a new “modern Jewish city” both for practical reasons – 
creating housing for the area’s Jewish population that had doubled over the previous decade — 
as well as ideological ones. They hoped to create a “nationalist-Zionist society” with a focus on 
developing Hebrew cultural and educational institutions and prevent the continued flow of 
Jewish capital to Arab landlords, which was the primary drain of money out of the Jewish sector. 
Despite some members’ insistence on using only Jewish labor to construct the early 
neighborhoods of Tel Aviv, the organization ultimately also employed Arab workers, who were 
paid less and were better skilled, to build most of the first homes in the neighborhood. By 1910, 
however, clashes had erupted between Jewish and Arab workers on the project, and Palestinian 
Arab guards had been replaced by Jewish ones.53 
 As I have shown, Hebrew labor sentiment had both economic and ideological roots – it 
was meant to secure steady employment for newer Jewish arrivals in a slack labor market, but it 
was also deeply rooted in a cultural and spiritual movement to redeem Jews physically and 
socially. I would add to this that the argument for “purity” of Hebrew labor also stemmed from a 
reactionary sentiment. The campaign for Hebrew labor that emerged in this period was a project 
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of newer Ashkenazi Jewish immigrants, but it seems clear that it would have also constituted a 
response to the pre-existing structures of integration and the gradual process of acculturation that 
newer arrivals seemed to be pulled into given the realities of life and labor in early settlements – 
both rural and urban. The evident practical integration discussed above, as well as the presence 
of vocal integrationists discussed below, would motivate an urgency for those who pushed for the 
purification of language and culture and for segregation in labor. In other words, in addition to 
being a movement that responded to economic hardship and a lack of employment for Jews that 
had led to emigration of large numbers of Jews from Palestine, Hebrew Labor was also 
intertwined with the cultural Hebrew revival movement that mandated the creation of a cultural 





Chapter 2: Revisiting Sephardi Zionists 
 This chapter will focus on three Sephardi Zionists who advocated for integrationism: 
Shimon Moyal, Esther Azhari Moyal, and Nissim Malul. In order to see similarities with the 
Ashkenazi integrationists discussed below, it is important to draw attention to the ways in which 
Malul and the Moyals wrote about and called for specific measures meant to encourage a shared 
civic and cultural life. Specifically, they called for shared institutions between Jews and Arabs, 
developing knowledge of Arabic as a shared language, a development-first approach to Zionism, 
and the need to call attention to growing Arab Palestinian resentment in the press. In addition I 
will show how their discourse around Semitic identity as a racial category was woven into this 
advocacy and how it may have shaped their view of potential Jewish-Arab cooperation. 
Studies of Sephardi Ottomanism and Zionism in the last decade has been led by Abigail 
Jacobson and Michelle Campos, whose work on late Ottoman Mizrahi Jewry has contributed a 
great deal to the field of Sephardi Zionism and Ottoman Jewish political life in the early 
twentieth century. Both historians also address Ottoman Sephardi attitudes towards “the Arab 
Question.” Jacobson in particular has led recent scholarship on Nissim Malul and Shimon 
Moyal, two intellectuals of North African descent who pushed consistently in Zionist circles for 
joint Jewish-Arab publications and cultural initiatives. 
In her article “Sephardim, Ashkenazim and the 'Arab Question' in Pre-First World War 
Palestine: A Reading of Three Zionist Newspapers,” Jacobson outlines the divisions between the 
Ashkenazi labor press -- ha-Po’el ha-Tza’ir and ha-Ahdut -- and the Sephardi press, represented 
by ha-Herut. She argues that the Ashkenazi labor press focused on Arab competition and the 
path to control labor in Palestine while the Sephardi press sought to change Arab public opinion, 
expressing hope for cooperation. In a nutshell, she argues, Sephardim uniquely realized the 
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importance and necessity of coexisting and co-operating with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, 
having recognized that Jewish life in Palestine was “subject to the ability to co-operate with the 
Arabs.” Sephardim were in a unique position as they “did not wish to undermine any Jewish 
national characteristics (such as the Hebrew language, for example), but nevertheless wanted to 
respect and learn the customs and practices of the Arab population.”54   
In her most recent book, she summarizes the perspective of the Sephardi community, 
particularly in Jerusalem: “On the one hand, the Sephardim were aware of the possible threat that 
the Arab national movement posed to the Jewish nationalist project. On the other hand, they 
were also more open and willing to see the Arabs, especially the Muslims, as possible partners 
for future life in the country.” These two ideological forces “existed side by side” among 
Sephardim. In contrast, she writes that the Second Aliyah Ashkenazi immigrants to Palestine 
were influenced by socialist ideology, and that they were more suspicious of Arab intentions 
given their memories of riots and pogroms against Jews in Russia and because they were 
unfamiliar with local life in Palestine and the Arabic language.55 This contrast between the 
“Sephardi view” and the “Ashkenazi view” is critical for Jacobson’s argument that Zionism was 
not a monolithic ideology and that approaches to it varied by community. However what I argue 
is missing, or overshadowed, in this discussion is both the role of race and Semitism in the 
Sephardi discourse and the connections between Ashkenazi and Sephardi integrationists.  
 Campos, in a similar vein, argues in her monograph Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, 
Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine that Sephardi Zionists saw civic 
participation in Ottoman life as critical and compatible with the Zionist project while 
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“instrumentalist” Ashkenazim saw Ottoman civic participation as good strategy but “devoid of 
any inherent value” beyond its ability to allow Palestinian Jews to push for Zionist separatism.56 
She argues that Zionism gained adherents in Sephardi/Maghrebi circles because of the failure of 
Ottomanism’s civic vision. “To the extent that it did exist,” Campos writes, “Sephardi and 
Maghrebi Zionism was socially and ideologically distinct from the larger Zionist movement, 
divorcing Hebraic and Judaic cultural and social renaissance and local communal and economic 
development on the one hand from Jewish autonomy, anti-Ottoman separatism, and national 
statehood on the other.”57 In other words, Campos describes Sephardi Zionism as primarily 
engaged in the Hebraist cultural renaissance and local economic development efforts, while 
Ashkenazi Zionism was focused essentially on autonomy, anti-Ottoman separatism, and 
ultimately, sovereignty. 
 In other words, Jacobson and Campos have positioned Sephardim as uniquely 
conciliatory and particularly invested in Ottomanism, or the movement for Ottoman civic 
participation after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, compared to the broader Zionist movement. 
Jacobson terms Malul and Moyal’s approach “inclusive Zionism” in contrast with the “exclusive 
Zionism” of the Second Aliyah. “Moyal and Malul presented a unique perspective on the 
evolving national conflict during the years preceding World War I,” Jacobson writes. “A belief 
that close ties must be developed between Jews and Arabs… that Jews who did not know Arabic 
must be exposed to Arabs and their culture, and finally, that it was important to act as loyal 
Ottomans in advancing and developing Palestine.” 58 Campos similarly places Sephardi Jews in 
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the unique space between Ottoman universalism and Jewish particularism – wanting to embrace 
the ideals of the revolution and yet also being exposed to the ideas and institutions of European 
Zionism. Campos argues that the cultural pluralism of Ottoman society primed Sephardi Jews to 
see no contradiction between cultural Hebraism, Zionism, and Ottomanism.  
 The conceptual framework for understanding Malul and Moyal set forth by Campos and 
Jacobson is important and forms the basis of my discussion, but what I argue in this work more 
broadly is that these two figures may be less unique than presented. By placing them within the 
larger group of intellectuals discussed here, I argue that there were others – like Esther Moyal, 
and the Ashkenazi Jews discussed in the next section – who shared in Malul and Moyal’s core 
beliefs. This suggests a shared discourse about Jewish-Arab cooperation and Semitic identity 
between the communities that was based less on ethnic descent and more on their views of 
Zionism’s ultimate aims. What a wider scope also shows is that Sephardim were not operating on 
the fringes, but were in fact instrumental in formal activities of the Zionist Organization in this 
period. This builds on the expansive work done by Yitzhak Bezalel in Noladetem Tsionim and 
pushes back against a characterization of individuals like Moyal and Malul as at odds with 
“mainstream” or “Ashkenazi” Zionism. It seems more accurate to say that they worked within 
and with the ZO and at the same time carried out activities – such as translation and publishing in 
the Arabic press – that they understood themselves to be uniquely suited for as Arabized Jews.  
There is a tendency by historians to flatten the experience of Sephardi Zionists – either 
painting them as savvy critics of Zionism and disregarded harbingers of the “Arab Question,” or 
alternatively as under-valued Zionist “pioneers” whose contributions were essential to the 
building of the Yishuv. What I aim to show here is that their intellectual circles and, by 
extension, their place within Zionism were more complicated. They both contributed to and 
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criticized Zionist settlement activities, they were alternately acknowledged and ignored by 
Zionist leadership, and they both identified with and felt marginalized by Zionist activities in 
Palestine. 
 
2.1 Shimon Moyal 
 
 Shimon Moyal (1866-1915) was born in Jaffa to a family that came from Rabat to 
Palestine in 1853. He was a member of one of the most prominent Sephardi families in Jaffa 
whose members were active in Zionist associations. Shimon’s grandfather Aharon Moyal was a 
Moroccan-Jewish merchant who brought the family to Palestine in 1853, where he established a 
Sephardic Talmud Torah school and worked to help absorb Jewish immigrants to the city of 
Jaffa. Shimon’s uncle was Avraham Moyal (1850-1885), a community leader and close partner 
of Baron Edmond de Rothschild, who played an integral role in establishing the settlements of 
the First Aliyah and eventually gained appointment as the Palestine representative of the Hovevei 
Zion organization. Shimon’s younger brother David Moyal became a lawyer and worked with 
the Ahuzat Bayit society, of which he was a member, on its land purchases near Jaffa.59 
Moyal traveled to Beirut at age 16 to study Arabic and French at the modern Jewish 
school Tiferet Yisrael (The Glory of Israel), also known in Arabic as al-Madrasa al-Waṭaniyya 
al-Isrāʾīliyya (The National Israelite School).60 Moyal then studied at al-Azhar University, where 
he met and was involved in the circle around the Islamic thinker and reformer Muhammad 
‘Abduh. Moyal eventually returned to study medicine in Beirut, where he met Esther Azhari 
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(1823-1948), who was born in Beirut to a family of Sephardi descent. The two were married in 
1894 and then moved to Istanbul, where Moyal finished medical school. The couple lived in 
Safed, Tiberias, and later Cairo, where they entered a circle of Syrian Arab intellectuals and 
published articles preaching understanding between Jews and Arabs in various Egyptian 
newspapers. It was here that Moyal began work on his translation of portions of the Talmud into 
Arabic and Esther published a women’s literary journal, al-A’ila (The Family), from 1899 until 
1902, as well as translations from French to Arabic including the works of Emile Zola.61 The pair 
moved back to Jaffa in 1908 and integrated into the Sephardi intellectual circle there. In 1913, 
the Moyals began publishing a Jewish-Arabic newspaper, Sawt al-Uthmaniyya (Voice of 
Ottomanism), which they had dreamed of pursuing for some time. They also helped found an 
organization in 1913 with a group of other prominent Sephardi intellectuals and social elites – 
including Avraham Elmaliach, Ya’akov and Yosef Eliyahu Chelouche, Yosef Amzalek, Moshe 
Matalon, and others – called ha-Magen (the Shield) that was meant to respond to anti-Zionist 
press and promote understanding between Jews and Arabs.62   
 In a 1911 article published in the Hebrew newspaper Ha-Herut, Moyal detailed his 
reaction to the situation of the Jewish Yishuv after returning to Palestine in 1908, granting a 
picture of how he viewed the place of the New Yishuv in Palestine and its most pressing threats:  
When I returned from Egypt about three years ago I saw the danger looming over the Yishuv due 
to the lack of knowledge of the leaders and great men of the Eastern masses, of their spirit and 
education and level of culture.… I saw the mistake of those who think that the people of the land 
are savages, and those who marvel that they are not similar to the ‘enlightened’ peoples of 
Europe. 
 
61 Jonathan Marc Gribetz, “An Arabic-Zionist Talmud: Shimon Moyal's At-Talmud.” Jewish Social 
Studies: History, Culture, Society 17, no. 1 (2010): 1–30. 
62 Abigail Jacobson, “Jews Writing in Arabic,” 165-182. See also Shmuel Moreh, “Moyal, Simon” in: 
Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World and Isaac Bezalel, Noladetem Tsiyonim: ha-Sefaradim be-
Erets Yiśraʼel ba-Tsiyonut uṿa-teḥiyah ha-ʻIvrit ba-teḳufah ha-ʻOt'manit. (Jerusalem: Yad Yitsḥaḳ Ben-
Tsevi, 2007): 390-391 [Hebrew] and Itzhak Bezalel, “The First Levantines in the Ottoman Period in Eretz 
Israel — Their Zionist Identity and Attitude Towards Arab Identity.” Pe'amim: Studies in Oriental Jewry 
no. 125-127 (2010): 75–95 [Hebrew]. 
 32 
 
In particular, Moyal drew attention to the fact that European Zionists and officials were 
overlooking one central issue: 
That the people of the land are not the same as the same people who rule in Constantinople, that 
the connection [an agreement] with the Turks would not bind the Arabs as well. And perhaps 
more: I saw the Arab Christians’ envy of the Jews and their incitement of the Muslims against us 
and their efforts to slander the Zionists in the eyes of the people of the land and in the eyes of the 
government. 
 
Concerned by these oversights, by his telling, Moyal set about working “in all my powers to 
eliminate this danger:”  
I gave speeches in Arabic, I spoke with Arab leaders, in gatherings of our people here I tried to 
show them their mistakes and explain how to be considerate of the people of the land, I 
encouraged our rabbis and our representatives to preach their demands in Hebrew in public 
assemblies and I translated their demands into Arabic, I founded a Jewish-Ottomanist movement, 
I forced the Jews to participate in the national celebrations and demonstrations, and I held 
meetings of leaders and administrators, and the officials of our public activists, to discuss the 
foundation of an Arabic newspaper in order to spread true news about Zionism and the Jews 
among the Arabs and to counter many of the Christian newspapers that are spending on us a 
fortune.63 
 
Moyal’s activities in Palestine were motivated by a fear of Arab Palestinian resentment, 
particularly coming from Christian Arabs, which he noted was not being taken seriously enough 
by Zionist leadership. Moreover, an ignorance of “Eastern culture” and its achievements had led 
European Zionists into a false sense of cultural and political superiority and a belief that pacts 
with Ottoman political leadership would pave an easy road for expanded settlement.  
Moyal committed himself to the task of publicizing the achievements of the Zionist 
Yishuv in the Arabic press. In one such piece, published in Jaffa-based Filastin in November 
1911, Moyal responded to a previous article, which he argued aimed to “stir up public opinion 
against the Jews” and neglected to mention the “modern agricultural tools” brought by Jewish 
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settlers who were using technology to turn their dunams into “gardens under which rivers 
flow.”64  
In addition to propagandizing in Arabic, Moyal invited rabbis and Jewish leaders to a 
general assembly to discuss “our status in the land” and the question of “our relations with the 
people of the land, a matter that cannot be delayed.” In an open letter published in ha-Herut in 
1912, Moyal explained the relations of Jews to Muslim Arabs: 
Palestine is mostly settled by the nation [le’um] of the Muslim Arabs, our ancient relative. This 
kind and noble people does not hate the Jews with a spiritual, racial, incurable hatred like that of 
the anti-Semites in Europe. The Muslims, if among them there are those who hate the Jews, then 
theirs is a religious hatred, a jealous hatred of anyone who does not believe what he believes. And 
for this reason, these types hate the Christian no less than the Jew, and even their own fellow 
believers who do not behave according to the accepted practices. 
A hatred such as this is uprooted from the heart by patience, by beliefs that follow the 
development of wisdom, especially through shared life and [through] the channel that will 
develop from the ties of friendship between Islam and Judaism, and an alliance against the shared 
hatred of those who hate the sons of Shem.65 
 
Moyal viewed the shared heritage of Jews and Arabs through a cultural, linguistic, and racial 
lens. He also distinguished between “European anti-Semitism” and “hatred of the sons of Shem,” 
which he suggested Jews and Muslim Arabs would be jointly affected by. He repeated in the 
same letter his belief that Arab Christians were fomenting unrest between Jews and Muslim 
Arabs, “spreading lies in their newspapers in order to interfere with the Arabs’ closeness to the 
Jews and to separate brothers.”  
He therefore argued that tensions between Jews and Arabs in the East would ultimately 
pass, unlike hatred of the Jews in Europe, because he understood them to be religious rather than 
racial, or essential, hatreds. This view, that European anti-Semitism was permanent and 
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intractable, was not unique to Moyal or even to the group of integrationists studied here. This 
suggests a broader influence by and connection with the larger discourse in the Zionist and 
Hebrew language press that asserted permanent enmity between Christian Europeans and Jews.66 
Moyal’s open letter presents a prototype of integrationist thought: he promoted the 
essential Semiticness of Jews as a basis for their settlement in Palestine and their fundamental 
compatibility. The view that Muslim Arabs would eventually cooperate fully with Jews on the 
basis of being an “ancient relative” is also seen in Sapir and Radler-Feldmann’s writings 
discussed below. In other words, the baseline racial connection Moyal believed existed between 
Jews and Muslim Arabs formed the foundation for their eventual partnership.  
 Moyal also elaborated on some of these views in his exchanges with Islamic reformer and 
writer Muhammad Rashid Rida. Moyal had been in contact with Rida and other contemporary 
Muslim thinkers including Muhammad ‘Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani from his time in 
Istanbul and at al-Azhar. He was reportedly a member of the joint Jewish-Muslim-Christian 
organization, al-Ta’lif wal-Taqrib (The Association of Friendship and Understanding), which 
was founded by Muhammad ‛Abduh and Muhammad Mirza Baker in Beirut.67 In one written 
exchange with Rida, Moyal responded to Rida’s assertion in his journal al-Manar that Jews 
supported Italy during the Ottoman-Italian war in Libya in 1911. Moyal insisted that the Jews 
had been loyal to the Ottoman government, and appealed to the similarities between Judaism and 
Islam: “My political belief is that Islam is one great political community built on a common 
faith, a common philosophy, and a common history, and so, too, is Judaism. And also that the 
Arab-Muslim race [geza] has a shared racial link [shituf geza’i] just like the Jewish race.”68 Here 
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Moyal did not directly suggest a belief that Jews and Arab Muslims were related to one another, 
per se, but rather that he believed that Arab Muslims themselves formed a cohesive racial group 
– that is, they were essentially related to one another – in the same way that he believed Jews 
did.  
In the same exchange, Moyal explained that he believed, perhaps influenced by the 
Islamic education he received, that most contemporary Jews were descendants of ancient Jews 
who lived in the Arabian peninsula, not descendants of the Jews who lived in Palestine and were 
conquered by Rome. The precise details of the arrival of Jews in the Arabian Peninsula is 
unknown, but one Arab legend that may have influenced Moyal suggests the immigration of 
Jews to the area following Roman persecution.69 Moyal viewed the two groups, Jews and Arabs, 
as intertwined both racially and religiously. Among his other projects, his translation of portions 
of the Talmud into Arabic were an effort to make some of these similarities more widely known 
in Arabic circles.  
In his activism and his writing, Shimon Moyal saw the founding of a Jewish newspaper 
in Arabic as a key way to develop understanding. He and his partners in publication, Esther 
Moyal and Nissim Malul, viewed their Arabic newspaper Sawt al-Uthmaniyya as a tool to reach 
other Arabized Jews outside of Palestine and as a means to counter the growing anti-Zionist 
press by explaining the “true” intentions of the Zionists to Muslim and Christian Arab readers. 
Moyal invested thousands of francs in the newspaper, but it ceased publication after the outbreak 
of World War I.70 This project can be understood as part of the larger Mizrahi/Arab Jewish 
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intellectual project that marked Sephardi Jews’ reckoning with Jewish modernization and the 
place of Jews in Palestine.71 
 The other major manifestation of Moyal’s commitment to Jewish-Arab cooperation was 
his founding role alongside members of other prominent Sephardi Families in ha-Magen. 
According to their manifesto, ha-Magen aimed to “defend by all kosher and legal means our 
status in the land,” to strengthen ties between Jews and Arabs in the “shared homeland” by 
translating Arabic articles into Hebrew and responding to Arabic and Turkish press. The 
organization was a product of the 1908 revolution: its members aimed to help secure full civil 
rights of Jews under the restored constitution and declared their intention to translate all Ottoman 
laws into Hebrew. The manifesto of ha-Magen was also in step with standard Zionist talking 
points: it emphasized how Zionists brought “industry and culture and commerce” to Palestine 
and that their efforts would “materially and spiritually” improve the “shared homeland.”72 The 
members even expressed their wish to establish a Jewish-Arab literary club. Moyal’s 
commitment to Jewish-Arab cooperation can ultimately be understood as a commitment to 
forming shared institutions, promoting bilingual initiatives, and emphasizing the claim that there 
were material benefits to Zionist development for all the inhabitants of Palestine. 
 
2.2 Esther Azhari Moyal 
 
 In the 1910s, at 40 years old, Esther Azhari Moyal shared in the efforts to promote 
Jewish-Arab cooperation. She was a member of ha-Magen and helped to fund the short-lived 
Sawt Al-Uthmaniyya in Jaffa, but she also undertook her own projects, contributing to the first 
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Arab women’s journal al-Fatat (The Young Lady) and later starting her own literary journal, al-
A’ila, which published articles related to family, education, and world affairs. Esther Azhari 
likely studied at the American College for Girls, later teaching at the Beirut Alliance Israélite 
Universelle school. In 1893 she began publishing in the Arabic press, contributing to major 
Egyptian periodicals including al-Ahram and al-Hilal, as well as contributing to the Hebrew 
language periodical edited by Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, ha-Tsvi and publishing Arabic-French 
translations. After she and Shimon Moyal moved to Jaffa in 1908, Esther continued to publish, 
founded a women’s organization, and edited the Jaffa-based Arabic newspaper funded by the 
Zionist office, al-Akhbar.73 Moyal was active in women’s organizations and wrote and spoke 
passionately about the need to promote women’s education and employment. However, she also 
expressed complex views on developing nationalism.  
In her brief article in Ben-Yehuda’s ha-Tsvi in 1909, Moyal wrote about witnessing a 
meeting of representatives from various Jewish societies in Jaffa, “For the first time I witnessed 
the clash between the views of the Sephardic Jews, whose circle of views and aspirations is 
Eastern, and the views of their Ashkenazi brethren, who are "full of the stream" of European 
views.” She expressed her hesitation at what seemed to be a brewing conflict: “At the beginning 
of the meeting I felt the same sad feeling that one feels when the clouds fill with lightning before 
the storm.” Then she describes how the delegates began to speak to one another in Hebrew and 
while “not every idea was understood” by each member, they were able to reach a general 
consensus. Moyal expressed her relief: “We can unite and walk arm in arm since we have 
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discovered that the rift that developed between Jews by the power of time, and the influence of 
the different nations into which we were exiled, is not so wide.”74  
This brief article – though not specific about the circumstances of the meeting Moyal 
observed – sheds some light on Moyal’s view of distinct spheres of Eastern and Western culture, 
and provides some context for the intermediate position that Sephardi Zionists like Malul and the 
Moyals found themselves in. For Esther Moyal these categories were particularly prominent in 
her writing about the future of Palestine and “Eastern civilization” more broadly. Though she did 
not use the term “Semite” or “Semitic,” she described Eastern and Western attitudes in some 
essential terms: “The Mizrahi, by his nature, does not like his assemblies to depart from the 
sphere he has set to discuss. He goes slowly and is satisfied, but rushing will bother him … He is 
moderate and mild, and it is possible that this aggravation is preferable to hasty speed.” 
Meanwhile, “The European is more excited, he wants to move forward in huge strides, despite 
the local obstacles which are not familiar to him…. he pursues the "principles" in life, at a time 
when it is too necessary to discuss real things.”75 Despite these perceived differences, Esther 
Moyal concluded that unity was ultimately possible given the core affinity between Jews.  
Moreover, Esther Moyal’s account of this meeting provides a picture of how members 
from Ashkenazi and Sephardi communities in Palestine – and in Jaffa as an urban center in 
particular – were brought to exchange by Zionist activities. This suggests that Zionism might be 
more fruitfully understood as an intellectual medium between individuals from distinct social, 
linguistic, and political backgrounds. The existence of such a forum as described by Moyal, 
alongside what we already know about the development of Zionist press and other Zionist 
organizations, provides additional information about how intellectuals from an urban middle 
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class would have exchanged ideas in Ottoman Palestine, and how those activities were 
themselves shaped by Zionism. 
Lital Levy has placed Esther Moyal, alongside a handful of other Sephardi intellectuals, 
in the unique space between the Arabic Nahda and the Jewish Haskalah. These two 
“enlightenments” happening in parallel were efforts to reimagine and redefine community 
identity in modern terms. Their progressive and reformist discourse engaged Moyal and the 
influence of these intellectual streams led her to support both Zionist settlement and its promises 
of universal advancement in Palestine while also supporting Arab resistance to Western 
encroachment.76 In a 1912 speech entitled “Nahdatuna” (Our Renaissance), she appealed to the 
audience, members of the Beirut-based charitable Shams al-Birr society, as Easterners facing 
Western encroachment to “fix whatever is wrong with our morals, and get rid of whatever is 
holding us back from a true renaissance and give priority to education, and useful jobs, with 
integrity as a guide, and freedom as a light illuminating our homes, schools, and markets.”77 
Moyal explained the need for development and modernization projects in agriculture, education, 
family life, and industry to build “an Eastern Arab civilization based on noble inherited virtues 
and a love for work and achievement, and thereby [to] take a prominent and uninfringeable place 
among other civilized countries.”78 The need to act and modernize to develop a new “Arab East” 
was a core principle for Moyal, as it was for other Arab intellectuals of the Nahda. Like other 
Nahdawi and the Islamic reformers who were her contemporaries and peers, Esther Moyal 
viewed a “renaissance of the East” not as a wholesale rejection of the West but as an indigenous 
 
76 Levy, “Partitioned Pasts,” 136-138. 
77 Esther Moyal, “Nahdatuna” (Our Renaissance), al-Hasnāʾ 3, no. 9 (June 1912), 408–15. Also reprinted 
in Moshe Behar and Zvi Ben-Dor Benite. Modern Middle Eastern Jewish Thought: Writings on Identity, 
Politics, and Culture 1893-1958. (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2013): 38-46. 
78 Ibid. 
 40 
renewal and adoption the advancements the West had to offer. Moyal advocated for the adoption 
of certain technologies, educational models, particular industries and practices but she wanted 
them applied to a revived “Eastern civilization.” 
 In the same speech Moyal also made reference to the novel agricultural techniques 
brought by Zionist settlers: “Is it not our duty to replace old agriculture, which is one of the 
pillars of our wealth, with new agriculture based on sound science, and send the school to the 
farmer whose circumstances prevent him from going out to it; and replace his old tools with new 
ones and introduce to him chemical fertilizers that can give him thirty-seven tons for every ton of 
crops, as is the average harvest in the modern settlements of Palestine?”79 As Levy argues, 
Moyal never used the terms “Jewish” or “Zionist” in her speech but nevertheless made the claim 
that such technological advancements would improve the lot of indigenous farmers, the region as 
a whole, and the larger Eastern Arab civilization-in-the-making. Moyal was therefore an 
advocate both of “Easternism” as a means of resisting Western domination and simultaneously a 
supporter of European Jewish settlement in Palestine.80 It seems she did not see a contradiction 
between her call to repel Western encroachment and her desire to replicate the success of some 
Yishuv settlements. This suggests a view that Jews settling in Palestine did not constitute a 
threatening Western presence. This “development-first” mindset, the belief that Jewish 
settlement would materially improve the lot of indigenous Palestinian Arabs, was a cornerstone 
of the integrationist framework.  
 Indeed, this dual commitment to Eastern renewal and modernization was shared by 
members of Esther and Shimon Moyal’s intellectual circles, including members of the Ottoman 
Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya, the Decentralization Party. The party was founded by Syrian and 
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Lebanese émigrés in Cairo in 1912 in opposition to the centralizing efforts of the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP). The group of Ottoman intellectuals saw themselves as “enlightened” 
guides who hoped to direct the empire toward progressivism. The party’s main goal was a 
limited transfer of authority and power from the central government to the Ottoman provinces, 
which they envisioned as part of a loose federation.81 As active members themselves in the 
Decentralization Party, Nissim Malul and Shimon Moyal were central go-betweens in the 
attempt to broker a deal between members of the Party and Zionist leadership in order to form a 
joint front against the CUP. After a series of negotiations, the Party’s president, Rafiq al-‛Azm, 
published a statement supporting Jewish immigration in April 1913, in which he declared 
support for the rights of the Jewish nation and an agreement to foster an understanding between 
the Zionists and the Arabs. “We appreciate too well the precious combination which Jewish 
capital, manpower and intelligence can bring us for the rapid development of our provinces to 
commit the error of refusing them,” al-‘Azm wrote in his statement for the press. The 
understanding was premised on the assumption that Jews would adopt Ottoman citizenship and 
learn Arabic.82 
One way to further complicate the narrative about the place of Sephardi Zionists is by 
looking at both of the Moyals’ many connections to Nahdawi and reformist circles, which 
suggest an embeddedness within other movements that influenced their thinking and writing. In 
addition to being involved in the Decentralization Party, Shimon Moyal had also been a member 
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of Muhammad Abduh’s interfaith Association of Friendship and Understanding (Jām‘iyyāt al 
ta’lı̄f wa-‘l-taqrı̄b) in Beirut, and continued to correspond with Rashid Rida through the pages of 
al-Manar. Shimon and Esther Moyal were also rather close with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, whom 
they met first when they lived in Istanbul. The couple named their first son Abdullah Nadim after 
their friend Abdullah al-Nadim, the Egyptian author, journalist, and a student of al-Afghani’s, 
and they named their second son Munir after a pseudonym used by al-Afghani in Misr.83 The 
Moyals’ time in Cairo also intersected precisely with the flourishing of the city’s Syrian 
immigrant community, which included Yaqub Sarruf, Faris Nimr, Farah Antun, and Jurji 
Zaydan, among others. The social networks and publications produced by these emigres would 
have influenced the Moyals, who published in Zaydan’s al-Hilal and other publications based in 
Egypt that were covering the “new sciences,” which included Darwin’s theories and their 
intersection with the “Eastern Question.”84 
Although Levy and others have explored the contributions of Jewish intellectuals to the 
Nahda, and their place in helping to create an “interdenominational community of Arabic-
speaking intellectuals engaged in an open-ended dialogue about knowledge and the world,” less 
scholarship has focused on how these activities intersected with their Zionism and how these 
intellectuals might have seen these activities as compatible. One strand the two movements had 
in common was an interest in progressivism and modernization. In Esther Moyal’s writing in 
particular, her investment in modernizing the “Arab East” is made plain. Moyal would have 
found common cause in both Zionist and Nahdawi circles in which revival and progress were 
closely linked and prioritized.  
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In addition, Moyal and Malul’s involvement in the Decentralization Party may have been 
connected to their Zionism because a loose federal model with diffused power among the 
provinces may have been seen as a potential path for increased Jewish settlement. As Hasan 
Kayali has argued, decentralism appealed both to those in “incompletely integrated” provinces 
on the outskirts and those more ethnically homogenous areas, “where increasingly articulate 
elites held that decentralization would better preserve a distinctive cultural ethos.” In addition, 
non-Muslim majority communities saw decentralization as a path to self-determination.85 It is 
possible, therefore, that Arabized Jews like Malul and the Moyals were drawn to the potential of 
a decentralized model as a vehicle for Zionism. Being both immersed in the Arabic cultural 
milieu and simultaneously participating in the early stages of Hebrew cultural revival, 
decentralism may have seemed like the natural choice that would enable such communities to 
continue to coexist. Of course part of Malul’s and Moyal’s vision within this framework was also 
that European Jews would make attempt to acculturate, like learning Arabic, rather than forming 
a hermetic cultural enclave. 
 
2.3 Nissim Malul 
 
 Moving finally to Nissim Malul (1892-1959), who was a member of the Moyals’ 
intellectual circles, we see that he advocated for many of the same approaches to Jewish-Arab 
integration. Malul was born in Safed to a family of Tunisian descent. He studied in Jewish 
schools in Safed and Cairo and later attended the American College in Tanta, Egypt, to study 
philosophy, Arabic literature, and journalism. He began publishing in the Egyptian newspaper 
al-Muqattam and in 1911 returned to Palestine to work alongside Shimon Moyal in the Zionist 
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Organization’s newly founded Arabic Press Bureau in Jaffa under Arthur Ruppin. Malul 
translated Arabic articles critical of Zionism into Hebrew and responded to them in the 
Palestinian papers Filastin (founded in 1911) and al-Karmil (founded in 1908). Malul also 
founded, with the support of the Zionist Office, the newspaper al-Akhbar in 1911 in Jaffa, which 
Esther Moyal edited, as well as the paper al-Salam. He was also, as mentioned, involved in the 
ha-Magen organization of Arab Jews and in the publication of Sawt al-‛Uthmaniyya.86  
It is impossible to disentangle the mobilization of the Moyals, Malul, and the Arabic 
Press Bureau from the growth of anti-Zionist Arabic press, first in the Egyptian newspapers al-
Muqattam and al-Ahram, and later in Syrian and Palestinian papers. Articles on Zionism began 
to appear more frequently in Egyptian papers around 1908, and they then appeared in Syrian and 
Palestinian newspapers by 1909. By 1910 and 1911 the number of articles about Zionism had 
expanded dramatically.87 Rashid Khalidi found that in 1911 alone, 286 articles on Zionism were 
published across the 22 publications he examined from Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, 
constituting roughly 40% of the published material.  
A meeting of Zionist representatives of the Palestinian colonies and Jaffa politicians was 
called in February 1911 to discuss opposition to Zionism in the press and protests by Arab 
villages surrounding Jewish settlements. Notes from the meeting, headed by Arthur Ruppin, 
report that a range of tactics was proposed in order to counter unfavorable sentiment in various 
sectors of society. The ideas proposed included promoting adoption of Ottoman citizenship 
among Jewish immigrants, purchasing subscriptions to Arabic newspapers in exchange for 
favorable coverage, ensuring the presence of an Arabic speaker in every Jewish settlement, and 
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distributing pamphlets explaining the benefits of Jewish colonization among Arab villagers.88 
That same year, the Arabic Press Bureau mobilized Malul and Shimon Moyal and also gained 
influence over the Beirut-based newspaper al-Nasir and the Jerusalem-based paper al-Nafir. The 
most significant forum for debates about the political consequences of Zionism was the Egyptian 
daily al-Muqattam, in which advocates of Zionism including Malul as well as Jacques Levy al-
Tantawi responded to arguments from Shakib Arslan, Rafiq al-‘Azm, Shibli Shumayyil, ‘Isa al-
‘Isa, and others.89 
This project – the “conquest of the press,” as Moyal called it in 191290 – triggered its own 
backlash. Emmanuel Beška has shown how the position of the newspaper Filastin, and its editor-
in-chief Yusuf al-‘Isa, towards Zionism changed over the course of its short pre-World War I run 
between 1911 and 1914. In the beginning the paper was “cautiously favorable” towards Zionist 
settlement, but the editors gradually moved to criticism as they noticed detrimental effects on the 
Arab Palestinian urban economy, the social conditions of non-Jewish population, and the 
growing exclusivism of the Zionists. Filastin also took note of and began responding to those 
Jewish authors carrying out the Zionist propaganda campaign in the Arabic press, including 
Menashe Meirovitch, Abraham Ludvipol, Shimon Moyal, Nissim Malul and David Yellin. Beška 
concludes that it was not until the very end of 1912 that the paper began to criticize Zionism 
more consistently and harshly.91 
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But readers of Filastin, and naturally also its editors, may have already had knowledge of 
the Zionists’ Arabic press project as of November 1911, when an unsigned article reported on the 
“unseen battle” happening between Jewish leaders about the establishment of an Arabic 
newspaper. “What is seen is the battle between Zionists and their opponents in the pages of the 
Arabic newspapers,” wrote the anonymous contributor. “But what is unseen is the war taking 
place among the Israelites themselves in the pages of the Jerusalem Hebrew press.” The author 
recounted the proposal by Shimon Moyal to found an Arabic newspaper “to defend the Israelites 
and promote their interests.” Avraham Ludvipol, head of the Press Bureau at the Zionist Office, 
opposed the plan on financial terms and suggested instead printing articles in existing papers 
because “once the people realize the paper is Israeli [isra’eliyya], they will not accept it.”92 The 
anonymous column recounted the intra-Zionist negotiation over best strategies to sway public 
opinion for all to read. Therefore, the press battle in Arabic newspapers could be understood as 
something of a feedback loop, and it is important to note that the Zionist efforts to publish 
favorable reports in Arabic were evidently rather transparent. 
Campos has called Malul “the paid translator and main propagandist for the Zionist 
movement from 1911 to 1914,”93 and it is certainly true that much of his Arabic press activity 
was funded and pushed forward by the organization under the larger propaganda project 
described above, but Malul’s writing in Hebrew further complicates the picture. It suggests that 
he not only had a platform that he worked to promote among Arabic readers but also a platform 
for Hebrew readers, and one that was rather contentious. In June 1913 in ha-Herut, Malul 
published his personal platform in a series of articles that was printed with objections and notes 
from the paper’s editorship expressing alternating disagreement and shock at Malul’s line of 
 
92 Mā yurā wa mā lā yurā [What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen]. Filasṭīn, 28 October 1911, 81, 3. 
93 Campos, Ottoman Brothers, 287n123. 
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argument. For example, Malul’s copy was printed in ha-Herut with the following annotations: 
“If we, the heirs of Rabbi Yehudah Ha-Levi and Maimonides, wish to follow in their ways, we 
must know Arabic well and merge with the Arabs (?! The Editors) the way they, the great sages, 
did (?! The Editors).”94 Malul’s platform evidently set him apart from the Sephardi editorship of 
ha-Herut95 and was also far from being in lock-step with his supervisor Ruppin’s view of the 
cultural and racial landscape of Palestine. 
 The series of articles laid out Malul’s case for integration, emphasizing the need to 
connect with Arabic language and culture as a means of developing a “true” Jewish culture and 
as a means of forming a functional political relationship with the Ottoman government. The three 
articles were titled “The question of Hebrew teaching of Arabic,” “Participating in the struggle 
for Arab rights and establishing a Jewish-Arab newspaper,” and “Our status in the country.” 
Malul argued for the study of Arabic on the basis that, “If we [Jews] want to settle in this land, 
the land of our past and our future, we must learn its language.” He warned that neglecting to 
teach Arabic to Jewish children would result in isolation, leaving Jews “separated from all other 
peoples living under Ottoman rule.”96 
In an earlier article responding to a critic, Malul defended against the accusation that he 
had called for “merging” and “assimilation” [hitchabrut me’tzad echad v’hi hitbolelut] with the 
Arabs, but in a subsequent article – also quoted above – he contradicted himself and concluded 
that to be the heirs of the “great sages,” contemporary Jews must know Arabic and “merge” 
 
94 Nissim Ya‘acov Malul, “Ma‘amadenu ba-Aretz,” ha-Herut, June 19, 1913. Also reprinted in Behar and 
Benite, Modern Middle Eastern Thought, 65-69. 
95 Ha-Herut was founded by Avraham Elmaliach in 1909, and while editors throughout its run were 
Sephardic, its contributors were diverse. The paper’s inaugural issue stated its aim of being an “important 
Eretz-Israeli newspaper,” rather than a niche Sephardi publication. See Gribetz, Defining Neighbors, 97-
98. 
96 Nissim Malul, “Ma‘amadenu ba-Aretz: She’elat Limud Ivrit-Aravit,” ha-Herut, June 17, 1913. 
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[lehitmazeg] with the Arabs. Here Malul appeals to the shared history of Jews and Arabs as a 
template for present day relations: “As a Semitic nation [le’um shemi] we must reinforce our 
Semitic nationhood and not blur it within European culture,” Malul wrote. “By utilizing Arabic 
we can create a real Hebrew culture, but if we blend it with European elements we will simply be 
committing suicide.”97 In this final article, Malul was fending off criticism that he was 
undermining Hebrew cultural efforts by advocating for the adoption of Arabic in Jewish and 
Zionist circles. His claim that importing European culture to Palestine would be “committing 
suicide” can be read in different ways. On the one hand Malul may have been referring to the 
project of reviving the “golden age” of the Jewish “great sages,” which would be sabotaged if the 
Arab Muslim context in which figures like Maimonides worked was ignored. On the other hand, 
he could be referring to the larger project of a Palestine-based Hebrew revival as distinct from 
diasporic Jewish culture, which would be undermined by a mimicking of European styles. In 
either case, the project of creating a new Hebrew culture was tied to the idea of Semitism for 
Malul, who described the Jews as fundamentally Semitic and only incidentally influenced by 
European culture.  
In his articles Malul explicitly called out the European Zionists who did not speak or read 
Hebrew, like Max Nordau, suggesting that this transgression should be of greater concern to 
those who proclaimed their commitment to Hebrew culture. According to Malul, “real Hebrew 
culture” was premised on knowledge of Arabic and could only develop within a properly Semitic 
context. His articles showed both a strong commitment to advancing the Zionist cause – indeed, 




that knowledge of Arabic and functional relations with Arabs and Ottoman authorities were a 
fundamental pillar of the Yishuv.  
What I have emphasized in this overview of Sephardi intellectual activity is the message 
shared by these figures – namely, the need to promote cooperation between Jews and Arabs by 
forming shared institutions, by developing knowledge of Arabic language and culture, and by 
emphasizing the developmental benefits of Zionism. I have also aimed to complicate the picture 
of their place within the Zionist movement by emphasizing their embeddedness within Zionist 
circles as well as other reformist and progressive networks. They spoke from within the Zionist 
movement and used the language of Semitism to advocate for cooperative development. They 
did not view their equal commitments to Zionism and Ottomanism as contradictory – in part 
because they viewed Zionism as a movement to advance Jewish civil rights under the new 
constitution as well as a movement to bring economic, material, and cultural development to 
Palestine. They encouraged a shared civic and cultural life that was rooted in a sense of 
Ottomanism and were simultaneously deeply concerned with the growing anti-Zionist sentiment 
in the Arabic press. They worked not only to draw attention to it within the Zionist movement 
but also to write against it and mend what they saw as a misunderstanding of Zionist intentions.  
In addition, I have demonstrated how their understanding of Jews as Semites played a 
critical role in their belief in Jewish-Arab cooperation and in their commitment to Zionism – 
suggesting that subscription to the Semitic idea was not a strictly European Jewish phenomenon, 
but rather that the idea also appeared as self-evident fact in the writing of Mizrahi and Sephardi 
Jews as well. Echoing Lilienblum, Malul and the Moyals did not use the term “Semites” and 
“Semitic” rhetorically, but rather as a statement of fact, expressing their given understanding of 
Jews’ collective origins. The rhetoric used by figures like the Moyals and Malul has generally 
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been sidelined, but I argue that it is precisely in these specifics – in the details of their cultural 
initiatives, their references to Semitism, and in their involvement with the larger Zionist 
movement -- that one sees the ways in which they practically and ideologically overlapped with 
Ashkenazi Zionists. This suggests that their activities and understanding of the situation in 
Palestine can be better understood within a broader intellectual context that included Islamic 
reformers, Ottomanists, and Ashkenazi Zionists, and not solely as a product of their place in 
Mizrahi or Sephardi circles.  
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Chapter 3: Ashkenazi Integrationists 
 Ashkenazi Zionists including Yehoshua Radler-Feldmann, Eliyahu Sapir, and Yitzhak 
Epstein wrote about many of the same ideas as Malul and the Moyals. These Ashkenazi 
integrationists were also fierce critics of political Zionism, and some promoted Ottomanism. 
There were others whose integrationist or Ottomanist efforts are noteworthy – Eliezer Ben-
Yehuda, Moshe Ayzman, Aaron Aharonson, and Selig Suskin – but whose work I will not cover 
in detail here.98 The three Ashkenazim I discuss, who were interested in Jewish-Arab fusion and 
subscribed to the Orientalist idea of a “rejuvenating return East,” were also the same individuals 
who saw the Sephardi Yishuv as a potential ally in forming a nation.99 A common Orientalized 
view, though not at all universal, among some Ashkenazi intellectuals at the time was that 
Sephardim were “healthier” Jews, closer to the ancient Israelites, who had not been corrupted by 
life in the diaspora and whose Hebrew was more “authentic.” Their superior physical form, 
which Europeans believed had adapted to the land and the climate of the East, was seen as 
indicative of “superior moral traits.”100  
And yet coexisting alongside this view in European circles was one that suggested the 
longer-term “biological degeneration” of Oriental Jews attributed to poor hygiene, “racial 
mixing,” and other such deterministic factors. Ruppin, for example, believed that the “original 
Jews” were an Indo-Germanic race, to which Ashkenazi Jews maintained a closer lineage than 
Sephardi Jews, who he believed had “mixed” with Semites. This theory permitted a distancing of 
certain Jews from Semitic-ness while also explaining the supposed degeneration and inferiority 
of the Oriental Jews who he believed to be, at least in part, Semitic people.101  
 
98 Harif covers some of these figures in “Judaism and Islam in Pre-State Zionist Thought,” 210-226. 
99 Bezalel, Noladetem Tsionim, 58. 
100 Saposnik, “Europe and Its Orients,” 1114-1116. 
101 Bloom, Arthur Ruppin and the Production of Pre-Israeli Culture, 96-99. 
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  It is worth noting that these integrationists were not proto-Canaanites. The Canaanites 
emerged in the British Mandate period as a group of intellectuals whose Zionist vision was based 
on a radical rejection of the Jewish religious and cultural tradition in favor of a return to the 
prebiblical Canaanite past. Despite the fact that some of these integrationists argued for a return 
to the “primordial” East, Judaism and Jewish identity firmly grounded their outlook, setting them 
at odds with the Canaanite ethos.102 Nevertheless, the connection between the idealized Semitic 
racial discourse in this period and the later Canaanite discourse could be worth exploring more 
extensively. However, the Ashkenazi figures examined here viewed the Semitic race as their 
heritage, and they spoke about it in effusive, Orientalized language that conveyed their belief in 
the potency of a movement to “return East.” Granting their skewed view of Sephardim and 
Arabs, Ashkenazi integrationists were developing and supporting a largely similar set of goals to 
those of the Moyals and Malul. In promoting Arab-Jewish cooperation, they also laid a critical 
rhetorical foundation for the persistence of the Semitic idea and the racial belonging of Jews to 
Palestine. 
 
3.1 Yehoshua Radler-Feldmann (Rabbi Binyamin) 
 
 One such figure was Yehoshua Radler-Feldmann (1880-1957), who wrote under the pen 
name “Rabbi Binyamin.” Radler-Feldmann was born in Hapsburg Galicia in the town of Zborov 
(today Zboriv in western Ukraine), to a religious family. He studied at the traditional heder 
schools and the beit midrash in Zborov. At 21 he departed for Berlin, where he studied 
agriculture. In 1906 he moved to London and befriended Yosef Haim Brenner, with whom he 
 
102 On the role of Canaanite mythology in Zionism see David Ohana, The Origins of Israeli Mythology: 
Neither Canaanites nor Crusaders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 1-38. 
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published the Hebrew journal ha-Meorer. In 1907 Radler-Feldmann immigrated to Palestine, 
where he divided his time between agricultural work, writing articles in ha-Herut and other 
Hebrew publications, and working with the Zionist Organization.103  
 Radler-Feldmann wrote widely on Zionism, religion and the East-West divide, but was 
committed to the idea of “pan-Semitism” throughout his life. He understood Zionism 
fundamentally as a means for Jews to reconnect with their Eastern roots mentally, spiritually, and 
physically. Even before arriving in Palestine, Radler-Feldmann wrote in support of Arab-Jewish 
cooperation and appealed consistently for Jews to unite in fraternity with the Arabs. In 
“Panshemiyut,” a piece first published in the Berlin-based Hebrew journal ha-Keshet in 1903, 
Radler-Feldmann laid out his vision of the Jewish return to Palestine, including settling among 
the Arabs, of whom he wrote: “we are brethren [anashim akhim anakhnu].”104 Radler-Feldmann 
understood Zionism to be not merely a physical and geographical project but also a spiritual one 
that could only be fulfilled by Jews tapping into “the primordial, spiritual well that the East 
symbolized.”105 
 In this spirit, Radler-Feldmann was highly opposed to the movement for the “conquest of 
labor.” Determinedly against the secular discourse, Radler-Feldmann viewed religious and 
cultural affinity between Judaism and Islam as the foundation for future cooperation within his 
platform of “pan-Semitism.”106 In his early work, Radler-Feldmann was against the purely 
 
103 Harif, “Judaism and Islam in Pre-State Zionist Thought,” 217-219. For more on the meeting and 
collaboration between Brenner and Radler-Feldmann see Anita Shapira, Yosef Haim Brenner: A Life 
(Stanford University Press: 2014): 80-99. 
104 R. Binyamin/Yehoshua Radler-Feldmann, “Panshemiyut” in Al ha-Gvulin: reshimot v’ma’amarim 
(Vienna: Union Press, 1922): 18-20. 
105 Harif, “Judaism and Islam in Pre-State Zionist Thought,” 218. 
106 Avi-ram Tzoreff, “‘An Imagined Desert That Is Indeed the Core of the Yishuv’: R. Binyamin and the 
Emergence of Zionist Settler-Colonial Policies (1908–14),” Simon Dubnow Institut Jahrbuch 
(forthcoming). 
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spiritual or cultural Zionism promoted by Ahad Ha’Am. His vision of a complete spiritual and 
physical Jewish return to Palestine was more in line with his support for Max Nordau’s 
initiatives for bodily and aesthetic reform: “You all shall come to the land and inherit it,” Radler-
Feldmann wrote. “Your tall stature, broad chest, and your muscles like bars of iron.” Among the 
generation he described in “Panshemiyut,” “there will be no critic or complainer, and no 
contradictor or mourner.”107 An observant Jew, Radler-Feldmann claimed that the Jews’ return to 
their bodies and to labor would be a return to God. He formulated an idea of Jewish-Arab union 
as a counterweight to European antisemitism – which he suggested that Arabs, as Semites, were 
also susceptible to.108 Thus, Radler-Feldmann argued that Jews’ belonging in Palestine was 
premised on their essential categorization – racially and spiritually – as Semites. “We have found 
our kind [matzah min et mino],” Radler-Feldmann wrote of Jewish settlement among the Arab 
residents. Only through complete recognition of Semitic identity would the Zionist project 
succeed, according to Radler-Feldmann. 
Moreover, Radler-Feldmann was skeptical of those who believed that merely touting the 
material benefits of modern agricultural and economic stimulus brought by Zionists would be 
enough to convince the Yishuv’s critics and opponents, or that it would morally redeem 
exclusivist Zionism. In responding to a commentator in ha-Herut writing under the pen-name 
Ikara, Radler-Feldmann wrote: “Ikara tells of the great good we have brought to the people of the 
land. I agree with this. It seems I, too, have talked about it enough, and perhaps even too much. 
But the question is how we brought it.” Radler-Feldmann was preoccupied by the moral 
approach of settlers and their clarity of mission in developing a settlement method that would 
 
107 R. Binyamin, “Panshemiyut,” 18-20. 
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elicit “desirable relations” between settlers and “the people of the land.” He wanted to curb the 
trend towards “snobbery, condescension, ostentation, and the degradation of the character of 
others” that he saw in settlers.109 
 In perhaps his most controversial publication, “Masa Arav” (An Arab Prophesy), Radler-
Feldmann returned to his vision of Jewish-Arab solidary. He warned against alienating and 
driving out the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and called on Jews to “Open your schools widely to 
him and his sons and daughters will come; And in them they will learn your language and his 
language; And you will publish journals for them in your language and his language.”110 He 
called attention to the groups’ common racial origins, believing they would merge eventually: 
“In the future he will be one of you and it will not be noticed that he was assimilated into you. 
You will give to him your sons and you will take from his sons.”111 More broadly, Radler-
Feldmann made the same claim as other Ottoman Zionists, that the Jews came to Palestine “to 
revive the land and its inhabitants” and would share with the Arabs “all the riches in [their] 
spirit.”112 Complete equality between Jews and Arabs was a pillar of this vision. In April 1912 
Radler- Feldmann followed up on these ides in “Bereshit,” in which he argued for the adoption 
of a pan-Semitic framework for Zionist settlement and the parallel development of Jewish and 
Arab settlements in Palestine. In one such proposal, Radler Feldmann cited the great efforts that 
went into building Tel Aviv, arguing it would not be so difficult to then turn to establishing a 
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similar Arab neighborhood. “The Jew and Arab are not two opposing forces,” Radler-Feldmann 
wrote.113 
 Radler-Feldmann also worked on the first Zionist memorial book in 1911, “Yizkor”, 
intended to commemorate the eight Jewish settlers killed in clashes with Arabs in Palestine 
between 1890 and 1911, including members of the ha-Shomer organization who served as armed 
guards for Jewish settlements. The organization of armed guards was founded after the Young 
Turk Revolution in 1908, when members of Poaeli Zion began discussing how Palestinian Arabs 
might mount a substantive competition for territory. In 1907 the party founded Bar Giora as a 
secret defense organization, and in 1909 the legal and public arm, ha-Shomer, was founded to 
address the increasing clashes with Arabs in the Galilee. Seeing Palestinian Arab opposition to 
Zionist settlement more openly expressed, the founders of Bar Giora and ha-Shomer placed 
themselves at the front of the “contest against the Arabs.”114 Members of ha-Shomer believed 
that Palestinian Arabs would inevitably oppose the establishment of permanent Jewish settlement 
Palestine, and that the best means to deter such opposition was by mounting a Jewish defense 
force and building Jewish national presence in order to ultimately allow for the coexistence of 
two national elements in Palestine. “In their view,” historian Yaacov Goldstein argued, “only the 
development and expansion of Jewish power would create the opportunity for a balance of power 
and, consequently, the possibility for mutual understanding and compromise.”115  
The organization’s contradictory efforts to simultaneously project strength and develop 
“neighborly relations” led to some odd displays of bravado, romanticism, and appropriation. Ha-
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Shomer guards adopted Bedouin dress and mimicked their riding style on horseback. The guards 
dawned bullet vests and carried their rifles prominently.116 This ambiguity also led to a slippage 
between efforts to assimilate, emulate, and surveille the surrounding Arab populations. As one 
member described, “The aim was to mingle with the Arab people around us, to become 
acquainted with the human and climatic environment as an organic part of it, as a people 
returning to its land by right and not on sufferance,” and simultaneously to study the Arabs so as 
to learn “their weak points, the disputes and quarrels among them, to be able to turn them to our 
advantage.”117 
Radler-Feldmann, though not directly involved in either ha-Shomer or Poaeli Zion, first 
suggested the creation of the memorial volume after the death of three settlers – Dov Shveiger, 
Shimon Melamed, and Yisrael Korngold – in the spring of 1909 in the Lower Galilee.118 Deep 
disagreements between the volume’s authors, which included Radler-Feldmann and Brenner, 
among others, delayed the book’s publication. In the end, Radler-Feldmann published his 
controversial preface, in which he further elaborated his view on pan-Semitism and Jewish-Arab 
coexistence: “We have returned to our country, to our homeland, with strong feelings of 
affection for the nation living here. … And we know that the one God, the God of Israel and of 
the world, calls upon us and upon the Arabs to unite in the common cause – to restore our 
country which lies waste to prosperity; to spread knowledge together; to share the benefits of 
human culture.”119 Even in this volume meant to commemorate the Jewish dead from clashes 
with neighboring Arabs, Radler-Feldmann used the platform to convey the need to promote the 
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concept of a “shared homeland” between Jews and Arabs. He urged “affection,” ahava, towards 
the Arab population and believed the two Semitic groups would come together, even completely 
assimilate, with shared institutions, language, and culture. 
Before the Yizkor book was complete, Radler-Feldmann published an article in ha-Poel 
ha-Tsair in memorial of Shveiger’s death and also responding to Yosef Klausner’s alarm at the 
“Arabization” of Jews in Palestine. Radler Feldmann wrote of Shveiger:  
He was becoming – or, at least, wished to become Arabized; to be like the best among the Arabs. 
In seeking to be totally Hebrew, he wanted to be like them. He wanted the Hebrew in him to be 
like the Arab in them. That writer [Klausner] who expressed fear in ha-Shiloah regarding the 
influence of the Arabs on the young generation in our country could have selected [Shveiger] as a 
perfect example. But so could all those who, from Benjamin Disraeli to the author of these lines, 
believe that the entire Semitic race [hagezah hashemi] really does have a great deal in common.120   
 
Here Radler-Feldmann highlighted the aspirational and Orientalized view that some recent 
arrivals to Palestine held of Arabs. Radler-Feldmann suggested that Shveiger indeed represented 
everything Klausner feared about Arabic influence, while at the same time serving as an 
idealized example of the return to Semitic-ness. To be “totally Hebrew,” for Radler-Feldmann, 
was to be Arab. Radler-Feldmann also consciously aligned himself within a larger tradition 
“from Benjamin Disraeli” onwards of believers in racial Semitism as an essential quality in Jews 
and Arabs. 
 Radler-Feldmann also worked in the Arabic Press Bureau of the Zionist Office in Jaffa at 
the same time as Nissim Malul. The department was composed of only three people: Malul, 
Aharon Mani, and Radler-Feldmann. Malul worked with Aharon Mani to translate Arabic 
articles into Hebrew and to publish responses. Radler-Feldmann oversaw the department’s 
operations and translated the translations into German, making them readable both to Ruppin and 
 
120 Frankel “The ‘Yizkor’ Book of 1911,” 450n16. 
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to members of the Zionist offices in Istanbul and Berlin.121 As Avi-Ram Tzoreff has argued, 
these three employees saw their work in the Arabic Press Bureau as a means to develop a shared 
Jewish-Arab space, where knowledge of Arabic was essential.122 Despite the fact that the Bureau 
was arguably the beginning of Zionist surveillance of Palestinian Arabs, its employees saw their 
participation in an entirely different light. For Malul, the Bureau was a first critical step in 
addressing the anti-Yishuv press, while for Radler-Feldmann it was a chance to understand the 
Arabic press and incorporate that knowledge into his advocacy. In his later writings, Radler-
Feldmann described this experience as his first exposure to the political and cultural 
developments in Arab Palestinian circles, and how he took “any chance for connection” with the 
Arabs.123  
 Radler-Feldmann, like the Moyals and Malul, was a product of the multinational, 
pluralistic empire in which he grew up, and the imperial context for his understanding of 
coexisting national, imperial, and religious identifications is central to understanding his 
intellectual project. Radler-Feldmann’s overlap with Malul in the Arabic Press Bureau, and his 
shared understanding of the desired forms of Jewish-Arab cooperation and integration suggest 
both a potential exchange of ideas between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Zionists as well as a larger 
common discourse of Semitism that he and other integrationists were able to draw upon in 
describing and promoting their vision. As the subsequent examples will show, Radler-Feldmann 
was not a sole outlier in this respect. 
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3.2 Eliyahu Sapir 
 
Another case study in Ashkenazi integrationist Zionism is that of teacher, banker, and 
botanist Eliyahu Sapir (1869- 1911). A member of the “Old Yishuv,” Sapir was born in 
Jerusalem to a family that had come from Vilna to Palestine in 1832. Sapir was a student of 
David Yellin’s at the AIU school and became fluent in German, French, Hebrew, Arabic, and 
Turkish. He moved with his wife, the daughter of a rabbi, to Petah Tikva, where he taught 
Hebrew and Arabic in the Baron Rothschild clerk’s school. He helped keep records in the Petah 
Tikva settlement and handled legal disputes over land purchases. Using his knowledge of Arabic 
and Turkish, he kept records of births and deaths in the settlement, helped with taxes and military 
rolls, and wrote official health reports. Sapir also reportedly used his ability to read and write in 
Arabic to help fellahin in the villages nearby in reading and responding to official papers they 
received from the government and in preparing petitions.124 His skills in estate law, which he 
learned in the process of handling local disputes, led him to work for the Jewish Colonization 
Association (JCA) in purchasing the territory of Sejera (today Ilaniya) for a farm colony.125 Sapir 
then took a position as secretary and chief accountant at the central office of JCA in Jaffa. He 
went on to work as an assistant to Zalman David Levontin and become the deputy director of the 
Jaffa branch of the Anglo-Palestine Bank when it was established in August 1904.126 This 
position took him into the upper levels of the Zionist Organization’s activities in Palestine – 
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Sapir participated in the February 1911 meeting discussed above, alongside Levontin and led by 
Ruppin to address the issue of opposition to Zionism in Palestine, in which attendants suggested 
various strategies to gain more favorable press and to demonstrate loyalty to the Ottoman 
government.127 
Radler-Feldmann named Sapir as one of his influences in his memoirs.128 And indeed, 
Sapir published early material on the Semitic – defined racially and linguistically – roots of Jews 
and Arabs as a basis for cooperation. In his articles published in 1899 in ha-Shiloah, Sapir was 
one of the earliest to ascribe anti-Zionism to Arab Christians in particular, believing Arab 
Muslims to be more predisposed to affiliation with the Jews on the basis of sharing Semitic 
heritage. “The Muslim-Arab people [am] is one of the people – or the one people – closest to us 
and to our hearts,” Sapir wrote. “Among these people, that is, the Arab Muslims, being also sons 
of Shem, there is to a large extent the same moral quality that our people have.”129 Sapir 
concluded that the Enlightenment in Christian Europe had rendered permanent anti-Semitic 
sentiment, whereas Jewish life under Muslim rule historically had been prosperous. This 
mythologized view of “interfaith utopia” in Medieval Islam was common among nineteenth 
century scholars of Jewish history, particularly members of the Wissenschaft des Judentums 
school, whose idyllic view of medieval Jewry under Islam contrasted the “sorrowful, oppressive, 
persecutory history” of Jews under medieval Christianity. These nineteenth century Jewish 
scholars developed the “interfaith utopia” model in part in order to challenge European 
Christians to actualize the promises of emancipation and grant Jews full rights and privileges 
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that, at a minimum, would match the treatment of Jews under medieval Muslim rule.130 Sapir, 
who had broad intellectual interests, wrote about Jewish history, and read both French and 
German, was likely exposed to some of these intellectual currents. By virtue of his fluency in 
Turkish and Arabic, Sapir was also exposed to the intellectual milieu of Mizrahi Jews like 
Moyals and Malul, and, like them, viewed the specifically Christian Arab opposition to Jews, 
and in Sapir’s work “hatred of Israel” (sinah l’Israel), as a critical factor that the Yishuv would 
need to address were it to succeed in settling the land.131 Sephardi and Arab Jews also turned to 
this medieval utopia as a means of understanding Jewish and Arab relations in this period, 
suggest a shared body of knowledge and references among Jews who came from distinct 
backgrounds. As Yuval Evri has shown, the legacy of al-Andalus and the Jewish return to 
Palestine were deeply linked for Arab Jewish intellectuals like Abraham Shalon Yahuda and 
Josef Meyouhas, whose translation projects were a means of processing the Jewish return to 
Palestine and its implications for the historical ties between Jews and Arabs.132  
In his writing Sapir alluded to the peaceful coexistence under Muslim rule leading almost 
to “complete assimilation” between the peoples. “In [Muslim] days we saw goodness, and his 
love and closeness to us is still a possibility for the future.”133 In addition, the sheer number of 
Muslim Arabs in Palestine made them a valuable ally, in Sapir’s view: “The Arab Muslim people 
is the majority and controls the land,” Sapir added in a footnote: “by this I mean in control of the 
territory, not the upper government, which is Turkish.” In addition, Sapir believed those living in 
Palestine’s cities and coasts were largely Christians and non-Arab converts to Islam, and 
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therefore non-Semites, as opposed to those communities living far from the cities and coasts who 
were “still pure of race and blood [tahur be’gezo u’damo].”134 For Sapir this would seem to 
explain the anti-Zionist press coming out of Christian-owned urban presses. Sapir’s cosmology 
of Semitic races and affiliations illustrates the complex intertwining of racial, ethnic, and 
religious categories that emerged at the fin de siècle alongside the development of eugenics and 
racial purity. However, critical for the purposes of this discussion, Sapir’s proximity to the rural 
settlements and his role as an Ottoman quasi-administrator and record keeper placed him in the 
unique position of being in regular contact with rural Muslim Arabs. Based on these experience, 
Sapir suggested a fixedness of Semitic descent as a signifier of belonging to or living more 
closely with the land of Palestine, and as a signifier of rural Muslim Arabs’ essential similarity to 
Jews.  
In addition, as a reader of Arabic, Sapir, like the Moyals and Malul, saw the anti-Zionist 
sentiment in the Ottoman press as a crisis in the making. Believing a Muslim Arab and Jewish 
partnership to be possible and desirable, he recommended a vocal response on behalf of Jews. In 
one essay, Sapir wrote of the need for a decisive response, lest readers be influenced by hearing a 
consistent stream of negative characterizations:   
And what comes to us from this: that the hatred of Israel glimmers and arises in Arabic literature, 
penetrating the hearts of even those who are not in their essence predisposed to it. 
And the Jews stand silent! 
From the countries of Europe we exited with our hands on our heads, and to the Eastern lands we 
come with our hands on our mouths, blocking our ears to not hear anything against us. But others 
will hear and will learn to know us only as evil and to see in us a physical and spiritual danger to 
the land and its acquisition. 
If in Europe we work to no avail to root out and remove hatred of us, an ingrained and ancient 
inheritance planted and stamped in the hearts of nations, then the one way to save our honor and 
soul is to remove ourselves from the influence of the ‘general consensus’ … in the land of our 
fathers and the nearby lands we must be in every way, in our existence and our actions, an open 
protest of every word and false accusation levied against us, and most importantly, in the language 
and literature of these lands we must be as distinguished residents and not as guests.135 
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For Sapir, a strong rebuttal to negative press was critical. He also reinforced the idea of a 
permanent antisemitism residing in the European conscience. Moreover, he emphasized the need 
for Jews as Semites to return to language and land as residents rather than guests, situating the 
Jews as rightful inheritors rather than newcomers. 
In his writing, Sapir was critical of political Zionism and warned of the detriment that an 
importation of European politics would have on the goals of the Zionist movement. In the essay 
“One Small Question,” also published in 1899, Sapir was vocal in his opposition to the 
movement by Herzl and other Zionist leaders to win the official support of Kaiser Wilhelm II. 
After the Kaiser’s visit to Palestine in 1898, Herzl and others were eager to gain his official 
support for Jewish settlement and there were talks of making portions of Palestine a German 
protectorate. Sapir was harsh in his rebuke of this approach: “I do not know how much truth 
there is to this talk, …but the rise of the Germans in the land and their determination to take all 
that is good in their hands would be obvious to all residents,” Sapir wrote in the essay. He 
continued: “Every man will realize how the German — who does not come to the land out of 
spiritual attachment and a desire to resurrect the nation — will exploit all the goodness of the 
land for himself and how much hatred he will summon in the hearts of the people [am] residing 
in the land, who do not yet even know Israel authentically and from which Israel itself runs and 
does not seek to love.” A committed Zionist, Sapir had withering criticism for the approach of 
Zionism’s European leaders: 
Isn’t this also a paradox, that the Zionist leaders, whose entire goal was to get rid of antisemitism, 
themselves support German politics and its triumph in the land of our Fathers, while everyone 
knows that Germanism [germanismus] and antisemitism are one and the same, and that in every 
place that the German comes to, he brings with him the hatred of Israel? 
Although the Zionist movement is sublime and valuable, the way its leaders pursue it, how they 
take every measure possible to secure this ‘guarantee’ -- this way is in danger.136  
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In other words, Sapir believed the best route was slow and deliberate integration, while relying 
on the Ottoman authorities rather than the backing of imperial powers.137 To bring in an imperial 
power, argued Sapir, would endanger the integrity of the entire project, which he viewed as 
premised on deep personal investment in the land. In focusing attention on gaining a charter or 
other imperial backing, Sapir suggested, Zionists would be importing latent antisemitism and 
therefore would be undermining their own stated goals. Both Sapir and Radler-Feldmann used 
their integrationist perspective as a basis for criticism of Zionist leadership and a political 
Zionism that they characterized as inherently and damagingly separatist. 
 Sapir’s life and work present a complicated case that helps to suggest porous barriers 
between the Ashkenazi and Sephardi communities in Palestine, and even between the supposedly 
separate “Old Yishuv” and “New Yishuv.” As a member of the Ashkenazi Old Yishuv, Sapir 
penetrated official Zionist circles and came to be a critical agent in wrangling the legal and 
financial aspects of land purchases and settlements.  
 
3.3 Yitzhak Epstein 
 
 Finally, in turning to the best-known integrationist and author of the controversial essay 
“A Hidden Question,” Yitzhak Epstein (1862-1943), one can appreciate how virtually all of his 
most controversial ideas were shared by several of his contemporaries. Epstein was born in 
Luban, Belorussia and moved to Odessa with family when he was 14. He studied under 
Lilienblum and was influenced by the Hibbat Zion movement. In 1886, he, along with five 
others, went to Palestine for training in Rothschild’s agricultural colonies. After working for four 
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years in the Zikhron Ya’akov and Rosh Pinah settlements, he became a teacher. With little 
formal teaching experience outside of some private tutoring, he was appointed principal of a 
girls’ school which had opened in Safed in 1891, one year before Nissim Malul was born in the 
same city. He stayed in Safed for five years before moving to teach in public schools in Metulah 
and Rosh Pinah. He studied at the University of Lausanne from 1902 to 1908 and directed the 
Talmud Torah school in Salonica from 1908 to 1915.138 
Epstein launched a fervent press debate about “the Arab Question” when he published “A 
Hidden Question” in 1907. He delivered it in the form of a speech in Basel before the Seventh 
Zionist Congress, and two years later published it in ha-Shiloah. Epstein addressed the Congress 
in the same year that the two major labor parties, Poalei Tsion and ha-Poel ha-Tsair, were 
established in Palestine, potentially in an attempt to draw attention to the underlying threat 
inherent in Zionist exclusivism. 
Despite knowing no Arabic, Epstein preached the importance of knowing and 
understanding the Arabs, much like contemporaneous Sephardi intellectuals: “It is not enough to 
hold before us the end goal, but we must also have a proper understanding of the Arab nation, its 
characteristics, inclinations, hopes, language, literature and especially a deep understanding of 
his life, customs, pain and suffering,” Epstein wrote. “It is a disgrace that, to date, nothing 
whatsoever has been done in this regard, that so far not even one Jew has devoted himself to this 
topic, so that we are complete illiterates in anything concerning the Arabs.”139 Epstein also 
expressed support for shared institutions: “Let us open our public institutions wide to residents of 
Eretz Israel: hospitals, pharmacies, libraries, reading rooms, inexpensive restaurants, savings and 
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loan funds; let us arrange popular lectures, plays, and musical performances to their taste and in 
their language; let us give an important place to the Arabic language in our schools and willingly 
enroll Arab children in them,” Epstein wrote.140 Peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with 
Palestine’s Arabs would be critical to the future of the Yishuv, according to Epstein. 
Epstein’s speech has been more often analyzed as part of an inter-Zionist debate between 
“territorialist” and “democratic” factions at the Zionist Congress and he is credited with bringing 
the Arab Question to “center stage” within the movement.141 But another way to contextualize 
Epstein’s words is by viewing them through his experience as a member of the First Aliyah. He 
not only worked on the privately owned Rothschild settlements during his first years in Palestine, 
but he also spent time embedded in Sephardi-Ottoman Jewish circles as a teacher in Safed and 
later at the newly renovated Talmud Torah school in Salonica in 1908. Epstein was hired based 
on the strong reputation he built in Safed as an effective Hebrew teacher, and his modern 
pedagogical methods appealed to the Salonican Jewish leadership because they hoped he would 
“strengthen and modernize the Jewish curriculum of the Talmud Tora,” while also bolstering the 
dominant place of Hebrew instruction in the community’s schools.142 Epstein’s outspoken 
Zionism drew some controversy, placing him at odds with the Ottomanist consensus among the 
city’s Jewish elites. Epstein spent his time at the Salonican school putting the institution on the 
“path of progress.” He described some local Jewish practices as “backwards” yet felt that the 
Alliance’s French emphasis was leading students too far from Jewish instruction and a firm 
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grounding in the Hebrew language. His goal of modernizing Jewish and Hebrew education 
earned him the support of the more “traditional camp” in Salonica.143  
Epstein’s experiences testify to the ways in which First Aliyah settlement ideology and 
the aspirations of Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews living in Ottoman urban centers were ultimately 
rather compatible. As Liora Halperin has shown, Ashkenazim arriving in this period were able to 
find “common cause” with Sephardi communities because of a shared religious and economic 
relationship. The integrationist ideology developed by Zionists – the terms on which coexistence 
between Jews and Arabs was meant to be based – were compatible with those of Sephardi 
Zionists, whose message of cooperation was, perhaps ironically, closer to the more center- and 
right-leaning Zionist capitalists than the ideas of emerging Labor Zionism.144 In other words, the 
idea that employing Arabs in Zionist settlements would cultivate and preserve relations with 
Palestinian Arabs made economic and political sense both for settlers in Rothschild’s colonies 
and for the well-off Sephardi merchants and brokers who had a clear eye on the potential of Arab 
Palestinian resentment to grow. 
In addition, some groups within the Sephardi communities of the Ottoman empire were 
highly interested in the promises of “modernization” that European Zionists like Epstein touted. 
As the sections on Malul and the Moyals have also shown, certain elite Sephardi circles were 
drawn to Zionism or found means to support Zionist efforts precisely because of its declared 
progressivism. Modern education and industry – the core messaging of the First Aliyah – 
appealed to the Sephardi elites in particular who stood to benefit from the influx of capital and 
who saw themselves as the vanguards of progress. 
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What I have emphasized in this section on Ashkenazi integrationists is chiefly their 
overlap with the platform set out by Sephardim like the Moyals and Malul and their emphasis on 
the fundamental Semitic identity of the Jewish people as a founding principle and justification 
for their settlement in Palestine. But I have also complicated the set of influences on Ashkenazi 
integrationists, which came both on the ground in Palestine as a product of their interactions with 
Arab residents and with Sephardi communities as well as from their European education and 
continued engagement with materials and ideas produced there. What I have argued by drawing 
attention to these diverse points of contact is the overlap between supposedly separate ethnic 
communities in Palestine and the ways in which the ideas of Sephardi Zionists were adopted, 
accepted, or built upon by Ashkenazi Zionists who shared in their understanding of the 
movement’s ultimate goals. Though not at all universally adopted, the integrationist platform and 





When an expanded version of Epstein’s “A Hidden Question” was reprinted in 1919, 
Tiberias-based intellectual and journalist Hayyim Ben-Kiki responded in Do’ar Hayom with 
disappointment: “Epstein arrives at the same conclusions that were published in the journal ha-
Herut well before the War.” Though it may have been “impossible to imagine that the [Arab] 
Question would develop into such a complicated matter,” Ben-Kiki admitted, members of the 
Sephardi Yishuv had already raised such an alarm: 
The [Jewish] natives of this Land [the Sephardim] felt that matters were not being well organized 
and that all the noise — accompanied with that ringing arrogant tone that came at us from outside 
— was inappropriate for both the time and the place. The [older] Sephardic Yishuv, a community 
that came from the lands of the East to an Eastern country — whose soul was forged and formed 
along several generations with the Arab peoples — sensed that something unpleasant was taking 
place here, and that all this movement [activity] was not carried out decently. But the 
admonitions, criticisms, and warnings [of Palestine’s Sephardim] were considered meaningless. 
They stirred only ridicule and gave rise to accusations of assimilation. The new [European] 
settlers say that any Jew who speaks the language of his native country is assimilating. The 
leaders now see that the seed of evil that they have planted is beginning to produce fruit and thus 
see their mistakes.145  
 
This became the dominant narrative of the Arab Question and the movement to address it 
by means of deliberate Arab-Jewish integration: that Sephardi Jews had been the first, and 
possibly the only, ones to try to call attention to the destructive forces of Zionist exclusivism. 
Ben-Kiki was correct that Sephardim were dismissed and sidelined based on their perceived 
proximity to or assimilation into “the enemy”– and they would continue to be through the 
Mandate and well into the period of Israeli statehood. But what I have aimed to show here is the 
overlooked spread of their ideas into Ashkenazi circles and the ways in which Sephardi 
contributions were heard and adopted by some in the period before World War I. 
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In part, what this thesis has responded to is the tendency in historical scholarship to 
flatten and isolate the experience of Sephardi Zionists. Two contradictory streams tend to 
essentialize the Sephardim – either as ignored but prescient critics of Zionism or as forgotten 
heroes of the Yishuv. What I have attempted here is to complicate the views, intellectual circles, 
and influences of Sephardi Zionists to better reflect the ways in which they both contributed to 
and criticized Zionist settlement activities and the ways in which they were simultaneously 
included in certain activities and excluded in others. One can examine these earlier networks of 
exchange while still recognizing the ways in which Sephardim were also being overlooked in 
this period. 
The historical study of Ashkenazim and Sephardim within separate siloes – a method that 
itself stems from the understanding that Sephardi Jews were ignored by the Ashkenazi 
establishment from Zionism’s earliest days – has concealed some of their shared ideas and their 
early networks of exchange. Even a relatively cursory look at these figures reveals practical and 
ideological connections between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Zionists: Radler-Feldmann worked in 
the Arabic Press Office alongside Malul, Epstein taught Hebrew in the Talmud Torah school in 
Salonica and was immersed in the Sephardi community there in the decade before World War I, 
and Eliezer Ben-Yehuda published Esther Moyal’s work in his journal and worked with 
Avraham Elmaliach to edit another Hebrew journal, Hashkafa,146 This suggests the existence of 
more networks of exchange between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Zionists, and a closer reading of 
some of their writing has indicated that integrationism and Ottomansim was not the unique 
province of Sephardi Zionists, but was rather shared by a larger cohort that consumed and 
published ideologically similar material. In addition to inhabiting the same spaces and publishing 
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in the same newspapers, the figures highlighted here shared a larger political and social 
framework shaped by their belonging to multiethnic empires.  
Certainly the marginalizing of Sephardi and Arabized Jews within the Zionist movement 
and in the State of Israel remains critical context for this discussion. The ways in which Mizrahi 
communities were transplanted to the newly-formed State of Israel in the 1950s, the 
discrimination against them on an institutional and social level, and the violent severing of 
communities and identities documented by Ella Shohat and others has undeniably shaped public 
memory and the writing of Mizrahi history in Israel.147 What I suggest is not a counter-narrative 
to this. I argue that it is productive to view Ashkenazi and Sephardi Zionists as working in the 
same cultural and political milieu in the period before World War I, even as they maintained 
some of their separate, intra-communal associations. For example, while the meetings of ha-
Magen may have been conducted in Arabic, and were therefore closed to non-Arabized Jews, the 
organization’s members still maintained their connections with Zionist officials, wrote in the 
Hebrew and Zionist press, and maintained contacts with Ashkenazim. The writing and work of 
both cohorts suggest strong evidence for Wallach’s claim that “in the early twentieth century, 
Zionism, Ottomanism, and integration with the local Arab society did not seem to be 
contradictory options.”148 By shedding light on the ways in which these communities overlapped, 
I have revealed one dimension of their shared intellectual history: that is, the belief in Jewish-
Arab coexistence on the basis of shared language, culture, and heritage defined in the emerging 
racial terms of the early twentieth century. The expansion of this framework to other time 
periods or topics in the history of the Yishuv in Palestine could be fruitful. 
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However, one cannot ignore the fact of the eventual failure of the binational and 
coexistence-based frameworks of Zionism. The movement’s end was clearly tied to the collapse 
of the Ottoman empire and the assurance of imperial backing for Jewish settlements secured by 
the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Both of these nullified the need for partnership with the 
Ottoman government – once viewed as a potential federal protector – and dulled the urgency of 
gaining favor in Arabic circles and with Sephardi Jewish figures by extension.149 
One limitation of this study is that the individuals discussed were all from an intellectual 
class – none of them directly owned tracts of land and none was personally concerned with the 
labor market that would have defined life for new Jewish immigrants and Arab agricultural 
workers. Sapir, Epstein, and Radler-Feldmann each performed a few years of agricultural work 
but went on to become, as discussed above, teachers, public intellectuals, lawyers, 
administrators, and bankers. As intellectuals, however, they viewed themselves as the vanguard 
of progress and patrons of culture, both classical and of the “revived” genre. They were also 
more likely, because of their class and educational attainment, to consume materials about racial 
theories that then informed their ideas around Semitism. In addition to considering the spread of 
these ideas outside of the intellectual class, a natural question this study raises is how Semitism 
and related racial theories influenced other Zionist initiatives after this period. It would be worth 
exploring how the categories introduced here – such as the key distinctions between Christian 
Arabs and Muslim Arabs – changed in valence and how such changes influenced Zionist 
strategizing in the later years of the British Mandate and into the period of Israeli statehood. One 
might also ask about the fates of these figures during and after World War I – how did their 
integrationist ideas evolve and respond as the geopolitical circumstances of Palestine were 
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transformed by larger powers? Finally, a more detailed genealogy of thought for these figures 
would be worth pursuing – the trajectories of individuals like Shimon Moyal or Eliyahu Sapir 
who straddled many overlapping social and political circles merit further study and such an 
investigation may be able to further explain the way ideas around Semitism and Jewish-Arab 
affinity traveled and were shaped over time. 
Despite the movement’s eventual failure, to ignore the development of the integrationist 
movement examined here would be to ignore the ways in which definitions of Zionism as a 
political, national, cultural movement have shifted over time and have been the product of 
struggles between various factions. Moreover, it would gloss over the varied motivations of 
individuals drawn to Zionism in this period who, in many cases, defined their affiliation in 
personal and affective terms and drew on their prior experiences as imperial minorities. In this 
way I build on Jacobson’s argument that there was pluralism and fluidity at this moment in time 
– but I have widened the scope to suggest that there was greater participation in the integrationist 
idea outside of the Sephardi community.  
Studying this “failed movement” has therefore revealed several valuable conclusions: 
first, that the eventual supremacy of the separatist factions of the Zionist movement was not 
inevitable, and that there existed serious skepticism about the ability of Jewish nationalism to 
succeed outside the Ottoman framework. Second, studying the six intellectuals discussed here 
suggests that Makdisi’s “ecumenical frame,” or the mindset that supported inter-confessional 
coexistence, was present among Sephardi and Ashkenazi Zionists in this period because their 
understanding of Zionism was premised on confessional coexistence in social, political, and 
intellectual life. Relatedly, I have demonstrated the existence of more robust networks of 
exchange that led to an overlap in thinking between Ashkenazim and Sephardim that may have 
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explained the spread of the “ecumenical frame.” Third, this study has supported the idea that the 
struggle over national language also represented a struggle for national belonging – Zionist 
appeals to learn Arabic stemmed from a belief in reinvesting in and developing an Eastern-based 
Jewish nationalism that was intended to be compatible with Ottomanism. Finally, by studying 
this bygone integrationist perspective, I have introduced a critical discussion of the role of the 
Semitic racial discourse and the ways in which it laid the rhetorical foundation for the racial 
belonging of Jews to Palestine. This idea appears to have provided the underlying logic for the 
integrationist platform for cooperation – the idea of shared racial heritage made a shared polity 
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